The other Nevada laws that reach your association.
Nevada has one of the most complete HOA statutes in the country, so most of what governs you is on the chapter 116 page. These are the provisions filed elsewhere — a ban on transfer fees in the conveyancing chapter, a short-term-rental rule in the middle of chapter 116 that most owners never find — and the things people confidently believe about Nevada HOA law that the statutes do not say.
Every statement on this page was tested against the whole Nevada Revised Statutes — all 835 chapters, 50,305 sections — not against a selection. When this page says Nevada has no law about something, that is a search of the entire code, and it is stated without hedging for that reason.
A private transfer fee is a charge payable on a future sale of the property, usually written into a declaration by a developer so that every resale pays them again. § 111.865(1) bars any person from creating or recording one in this State on or after May 20, 2011, and makes such an obligation void and unenforceable; §§ 111.840 and 111.845 define the fee and the obligation.
Two things to check before you assume yours is gone. The ban is not simply retrospective — § 111.865(2) declines to validate or invalidate an obligation created earlier, and § 111.875 deals with those separately. And if you are selling, § 113.085 requires a seller of property subject to such an obligation to disclose it.
Your own association’s charges are carved out, and more widely than people expect. § 111.840(2)(g) excludes from the definition any fee, charge, assessment, fine or other amount payable to an association of property owners — including a unit-owners’ association or master association — under a declaration, covenant or statute. That covers a community-enhancement fee calculated as a percentage of the sale price, so long as it is payable to the association itself. A percentage payable to a developer or an unrelated third party is what these sections are aimed at.
People argue about short-term rentals from the declaration and from city ordinances and miss the section that governs it directly. Under § 116.340, an owner of a unit in a planned community that the declaration restricts to residential use may use it for a transient commercial use — which § 116.340(4) defines as letting for remuneration where the stay is less than 30 consecutive calendar days — only if all three of these hold: the governing documents of the association and any master association do not prohibit it; the executive board of the association and any master association approve it (approval is not required where the community and one or more hotels share a master association whose documents do not prohibit the use); and the unit is properly zoned for it with any local licence obtained. A tenancy of 30 days or more is outside this section entirely.
Two riders worth knowing. A declarant gets a separate rule while it is still offering units for sale in the planned community (subsection 2). And the association may set requirements for transient use, including additional fees tied to the extra services or costs it creates (subsection 3). Renting for months at a time is a different question, and since 1 July 2026 it is governed by the rewritten § 116.335.
§ 116.625 creates the Ombudsman for Owners in Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels, and § 116.600 the Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels, which appoints hearing panels under § 116.675 and can discipline. § 116.750 sets out what the Division, the Ombudsman, the Commission and its panels have jurisdiction over.
The practical point is in § 116.755: the rights, remedies and penalties under §§ 116.745 to 116.795 are cumulative, do not abrogate anything you have at law or in equity, and electing one does not preclude another. So taking a complaint to the Ombudsman does not give up a claim — though it does not substitute for the § 38.310 mediation you must complete before suing. The Ombudsman also has a specific power an owner can use directly — under § 116.31175 they may review your association’s books on your behalf if the board refuses you, and ask the Commission to subpoena them if the board refuses the Ombudsman too.
These come up constantly in Nevada association disputes. Each one is checked against the whole Nevada Revised Statutes, not against a chapter.
The usual advice is that Robert’s Rules apply only if your bylaws adopt them, so you should check the bylaws to find out. Nevada is the other way round. § 116.3109(4) provides that meetings of the association must be conducted in accordance with the most recent edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised — unless the bylaws, or a resolution of the executive board adopted before the meeting, provide otherwise.
So the bylaws are the opt-out, not the opt-in. If your board is running meetings its own way and the bylaws are silent, the statute is on your side. The same rule appears at § 116B.545 for condominium hotels. While you are in that section, note subsection 1: unless the governing documents say otherwise, a quorum at a meeting of the units’ owners is 20 percent of the votes, counting proxies and absentee ballots.
Until 30 June 2026 that was broadly right: unless your declaration already restricted renting when you bought, the association could not prohibit it or require its approval. That section was replaced on 1 July 2026.
Under the current § 116.335, where the declaration authorises the association to restrict renting, or sets a cap on the number or percentage of units that may be rented, the association may adopt rules and regulations restricting residential rentals — to the extent reasonably related to the underwriting requirements of institutional lenders or of insurers. Two protections survive: a hardship waiver from the executive board if you are blocked by the cap, and declarant-owned units are not counted toward it. Both versions are reproduced in full on the chapter 116 page, because a dispute is decided under the text in force when it arose.
In Nevada most disputes between an owner and an association have to go to mediation before a court will hear them, and § 38.310(2) is one sentence: a court shall dismiss any civil action commenced in violation of that requirement. Filing first and mediating later is not an option.
But read the definition before you assume you are stuck. § 38.300(3) says “civil action” does not include an action in equity for injunctive relief in which there is an immediate threat of irreparable harm, or an action relating to the title to residential property. The full procedure is on the mediation and arbitration page.
Several states give a unit’s owner a statutory right to install electric vehicle charging equipment over an association’s objection. Nevada does not. Searched across all 835 chapters, the phrase “electric vehicle supply equipment” appears only in the energy efficiency standards for appliances — § 701.730 defines it, § 701.756 lists it as a “regulated appliance” between commercial dishwashers and water coolers, and § 701.768 sets its efficiency standard. § 484B.468 is about signs and penalties for parking in a designated charging space. None of them gives you a right against your association.
What Nevada does give you is the solar route: §§ 116.333 and 116.334 for a distributed generation system, and §§ 111.239 and 278.0208, which void a covenant that unreasonably restricts one. An EV charger is not a solar energy system, so those sections do not carry it.
Nevada’s super-priority is real and it is unusual: under § 116.3116(3) the association’s lien outranks even a first security interest to the extent of charges under § 116.310312, the assessments that would have come due in the 9 months before the notice of default was recorded, and capped enforcement costs. It is a slice, not the whole balance — and nine months is a ceiling rather than a fixed figure, because the same subsection shortens the period where Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae regulations require it, subject to a floor of 6 months.
And the slice is capped in cash. § 116.3116(5) lets only actual costs ride in front of the mortgage, no more than one trustee’s sale guaranty, and no more than $165 for a demand or intent-to-lien letter, $325 for a notice of delinquent assessment, $90 for an intent-to-record letter, $400 for a notice of default and $400 for a trustee’s sale guaranty — and no attorney’s fees at all. If a payoff demand puts legal fees in the super-priority piece, that is the subsection to quote back.
General information, not legal advice. Statutory text throughout this tab is reproduced from the Nevada Revised Statutes as published by the Nevada Legislature, current through the 2025 session, and may not reflect the most recent amendments. The absence statements on this page were tested by full-text search against all 835 chapters of the Nevada Revised Statutes.