Hawaii related & miscellaneous statutes

Two sit in chapter 514B and stop a collection action outright. A third is widely assumed to, and does not.

Registration. Every project or association with more than five units must register with the real estate commission for a biennial period ending June 30 of each odd-numbered year (§ 514B-103(a)). An association that fails to register, or whose registration is rejected or terminated, “shall not have standing to maintain any action or proceeding in the courts of this State until it registers” (§ 514B-103(b)). Two limits go with it: the association can still defend an action, and the failure does not invalidate any contract or act of the association.

The education trust fund fee. The same class of association — more than five units — must pay a condominium education trust fund fee within a year of the first unit purchase being recorded or within thirty days of the first meeting, and then on or before June 30 of every odd-numbered year (§ 514B-72(a)(1)). Miss the due date and there is a penalty of ten per cent of the amount due, and “the association shall not have standing to bring any action to collect or to foreclose any lien for common expenses or other assessments in any court of this State until the amount due, including any penalty, is paid” (§ 514B-72(c)). Again the boundary is stated in the same subsection: non-payment does not impair the validity of the association’s claim for assessments, and does not stop it defending.

There is a second fee inside the same section that funds dispute resolution: an additional annual amount equal to $1.50 times the number of units in the registered project, dedicated to supporting mediation or voluntary binding arbitration of condominium disputes, totalling $3 per unit until the commission adopts rules (§ 514B-72(a)(2)).

And the third, which is not a loss of standing at all. Most Hawaii associations are incorporated as nonprofits, and the department director may administratively dissolve a corporation that fails to file its annual report for a period of two years, fails to pay prescribed fees, fails to appoint and maintain an agent for service of process, or fails to file a statement of change in that agent’s name or address — after written notice and sixty days to correct (§§ 414D-248, 414D-249(a), (b)). A corporation so dissolved “continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any activities except those necessary to wind up and liquidate its affairs” (§ 414D-249(c)).

That is a limit on activities, not on standing. Section 414D-249(c) routes the winding up through § 414D-245, and § 414D-245(b) provides that dissolution does not “[p]revent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name” or “[a]bate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date of dissolution”. Winding up expressly includes preserving assets and discharging liabilities — which is what collecting an assessment is. Reinstatement is available within two years and, once effective, “relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the administrative dissolution” (§ 414D-250(d)). See the Nonprofit Corporations Act.

Hawaii has two solar routes, and they are not interchangeable.

Single-family dwellings and townhouses go to § 196-7. No person may be prevented “by any covenant, declaration, bylaws, restriction, deed, lease, term, provision, condition, codicil, contract, or similar binding agreement, however worded” from installing a solar energy device on a single-family residential dwelling or townhouse they own, and any contrary provision is void and unenforceable (§ 196-7(a)). The section reaches associations directly: a “private entity” is defined as “any association of homeowners, community association, condominium association, cooperative, or any other non-governmental entity with covenants, bylaws, and administrative provisions with which the homeowner’s compliance is required” (§ 196-7(f)).

A private entity must adopt placement rules, and those rules are capped: they “shall not impose conditions or restrictions that render the device more than twenty-five per cent less efficient or increase the cost of installation, maintenance, and removal of the device by more than fifteen per cent”, and “No private entity shall assess or charge any homeowner any fees for the placement of any solar energy device” (§ 196-7(b)).

The owner has obligations too. The device must comply with those rules, be registered with the private entity within thirty days of installation, and — if placed on a common element or limited common element — have the entity’s consent first; but that consent “shall be given” if the owner agrees in writing to comply with design specifications, engage a licensed contractor, and within fourteen days of approval provide a certificate of insurance naming the entity as an additional insured (§ 196-7(c)). Where a device sits on a common element, the owner and each successive owner carries the cost of damage, must keep insurance, and must remove the device when reasonably necessary for repair or replacement of the common elements (§ 196-7(d)). If a roofing guarantee or warranty exists on a common-element roof, the installing contractor must notify the entity in writing that installation may affect or void it (§ 196-7(e)).

Condominium units go to § 514B-140(c)(1), which puts installation of solar energy devices by owners of condominium units in the “nonmaterial additions and alterations” category and provides, subject to the provisions of the declaration, that installation “shall be allowed upon written consent of the board”. Subparagraph (2) then routes single-family dwellings and townhouses onward to § 196-7. The board separately has authority to install solar and wind devices on the common elements, but not on a limited common element without the consent of the owners for whose use it is reserved (§ 514B-140(d)(3)). See the Condominium Property Act.

Section 196-7.5 is built on the same frame as the solar provision, for a different building type. No person may be prevented by any covenant, declaration, bylaw, restriction, deed, lease or similar agreement, however worded, from installing an electric vehicle charging system on or near the parking stall of any multi-family residential dwelling or townhouse that the person owns, and any contrary provision is void and unenforceable (§ 196-7.5(a)).

A private entity may adopt rules reasonably restricting placement and use, “provided that those restrictions shall not prohibit the placement or use of electric vehicle charging systems altogether”. It may not charge a placement fee — but there is one express exception the solar section does not have: the private entity “may require reimbursement for the cost of electricity used by such electric vehicle charging system” (§ 196-7.5(b)).

The owner’s conditions mirror § 196-7: compliance with any adopted rules, registration with the private entity within thirty days of installation, and, for a system on a common or limited common element, consent that shall be given where the owner agrees in writing to the design specification, a licensed contractor, and a certificate of insurance naming the entity as an additional insured within fourteen days of approval (§ 196-7.5(c)). Responsibility for damage, insurance and removal for repairs runs with the stall to each successive owner (§ 196-7.5(d)). The section defines an EV charging system by reference to Article 625 of the National Electrical Code and allows a single system to serve several charge points (§ 196-7.5(e)).

The shortest of the three chapter 196 provisions and the easiest to state. No person may be prevented by any covenant, declaration, bylaws, restriction, deed, lease or similar binding agreement, however worded, from installing a clothesline on any single-family residential dwelling or townhouse that the person owns; any contrary provision is void and unenforceable (§ 196-8.5(a)).

The association keeps a real but bounded power. A private entity “may adopt rules that reasonably restrict the placement and use of clotheslines… provided that those restrictions do not prohibit the use of clotheslines altogether”, and “No private entity shall assess or charge any homeowner any fees for the placement of any clothesline” (§ 196-8.5(b)). A “clothesline” is defined as “a rope, cord, wire, or similar device on which laundry is hung to dry”, and “private entity” carries the same broad association-inclusive meaning as in § 196-7 (§ 196-8.5(c)).

Note the building types. Sections 196-7 and 196-8.5 both name single-family residential dwellings and townhouses; § 196-7.5 names multi-family residential dwellings and townhouses. Chapter 514B does not carry a clothesline provision of its own.

This right exists in the planned community chapter and has no counterpart in the condominium chapter. “No association shall prohibit or unreasonably restrict the use of a unit owner’s enclosed yard area for personal agriculture” — provided the use does not violate the association’s existing master landscape plan or other restrictive covenants applicable to the unit (§ 421J-17(a)).

Two boundaries are written into the section itself. It applies only to enclosed yard areas designated for the exclusive use of the unit owner (§ 421J-17(b)); and it does not touch provisions imposing reasonable restrictions, nor stop an association applying rules requiring that dead plant material and weeds be regularly cleared — “with the exception of straw, mulch, compost, and other organic materials intended to encourage vegetation and retention of moisture in the soil” (§ 421J-17(c)).

The definitions do the real work. “Personal agriculture” means “a use of land where an individual cultivates lawful edible plant crops for personal use or donation” — edible, lawful, and for personal use or donation, so a market garden is outside it. And “reasonable restrictions” are restrictions “reasonably necessary to protect neighbor unit owners or residents’ use and enjoyment of their property and do not unreasonably increase the cost of engaging in personal agriculture or unreasonably decrease its efficiency” (§ 421J-17(d)). A rule that makes growing food materially more expensive or less productive is, by that definition, not a reasonable restriction. See the Planned Community Associations Act.

Assistance animals are a fair housing question. Section 515-3(a)(9) makes it a discriminatory practice to refuse reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services where they may be necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a housing accommodation. Both association statutes name that obligation: §§ 514B-113 and 421J-16 each close by preserving the association’s duty to provide reasonable accommodations under § 515-3(a)(9).

Hawaii legislates the verification question in unusual detail, and mostly in the resident’s favour. Reasonable restrictions may be imposed. Where the disability is not readily apparent, verification of the disability may be requested — but the housing provider “shall not request medical records or access to health care providers, and shall not inquire as to the diagnosis, nature, or severity of the person’s disability”. Where the disability-related need for the animal is not readily apparent, verification may be requested and “may be provided by a letter or other communication from the person’s treating health care professional, mental health professional, or social worker”. And the statute closes off the shortcut in the other direction: “Possession of a vest or other distinguishing animal garment, tag, or registration documents that are commonly purchased online and purporting to identify an animal as a service animal or assistance animal shall not constitute valid verification” (§ 515-3(a)(9)).

The definition is deliberately broad. An “assistance animal” is one needed to perform disability-related work, services or tasks or to provide emotional support alleviating one or more identified symptoms or effects of a disability, and the class “may include but are not limited to service animals, therapy animals, comfort animals, or emotional support animals that may have formal training or may be untrained and may include species other than dogs” (§ 515-3(b)). See the fair housing chapter.

Ordinary pets in a condominium are a different section entirely. Section 514B-156 protects continuity rather than access: an owner keeping a pet under a bylaw that allows pets, or where the bylaws are silent, may replace the animal on its death and keep doing so for as long as they live in that unit or another under the same bylaws (§ 514B-156(a)) — and a later bylaw amendment banning pets does not reach an owner already keeping one (§ 514B-156(b)). Where the bylaws do not prohibit owners from keeping pets, they may not prohibit tenants from keeping them either, provided the owner consents in writing and the tenant keeps only the types an owner could keep; the bylaws may limit each owner or tenant to one pet (§ 514B-156(d)). Reasonable restrictions on noise, other pet problems and animals at large remain available, certain pests and prohibited imports are excluded, and nothing prevents an association acting immediately to remove vicious animals to protect persons or property (§ 514B-156(c), (f)).

Hawaii wrote the same rule into both association chapters. A provision in a condominium’s articles, declaration, bylaws, administrative rules, house rules or association documents — or, for a planned community, in any association document — allowing any of the discriminatory practices listed in § 515-3(a)(1) to (7) against a person residing in a unit who holds a valid certificate for the medical use of cannabis as provided in § 329-123, in any form, is void (§§ 514B-113, 421J-16).

The exception is narrow and conjunctive: the provision survives “unless the documents prohibit the smoking of tobacco and the medical cannabis is used by means of smoking”. Both limbs must be satisfied. A community that has never banned tobacco smoking cannot rely on it, and a resident using a non-smoked form is outside it either way.

Both sections then add the same saving clause: nothing in them “shall be construed to diminish the obligation” of the association “to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities pursuant to section 515-3(a)(9)”. So the cannabis provision and the accommodation duty operate independently.

The certificate itself comes from chapter 329. Qualifying patients register with the department of health, and the registration is effective until the expiry of the certificate issued by the department and signed by the physician or advanced practice registered nurse; changes must be reported within ten working days, and a patient may have only one primary caregiver at a time (§ 329-123(b)). A written certification must originate from within the State and carry the patient’s identifying information on a designated form (§ 329-123(a)). What an association may ask for is the certificate. It may not ask for medical records or access to health care providers, or inquire into the diagnosis, nature or severity of a disability — but that rule comes from § 515-3(a)(9), not from these two sections.

Hawaii’s general attorneys’ fee statute caps what can be taxed. In actions in the nature of assumpsit and on written contracts providing for a fee, the court taxes a reasonable fee against the losing party “provided that this amount shall not exceed twenty-five per cent of the judgment”; where the contract provides for 25% or more, or for a reasonable fee, not more than 25% is allowed; where it provides for less, not more than the specified rate (§ 607-14).

Then the closing paragraph of the same section takes planned community associations — as § 607-14 itself defines them — out of it. It does not name condominium associations: “Nothing in this section shall limit the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs by a planned community association and its members in actions for the collection of delinquent assessments, the foreclosure of any lien, or the enforcement of any provision of the association’s governing documents”, or affect a prevailing party’s right to recover more than 25% under a statute that specifically allows all reasonable fees. Note that the carve-out names the association and its members — it is not one-sided.

The same section supplies the definition § 421J-2 imports to decide whether a community is inside the planned community chapter at all: “‘Planned community association’ for the purposes of this section means a nonprofit homeowners or community association existing pursuant to covenants running with the land.”

The association statutes then set out who pays, and both add a proviso: no award is made to an owner in a derivative action unless the owner first demanded enforcement and gave the board reasonable time, or shows a demand would have been fruitless (§§ 514B-157(b), 421J-10(b)). Under § 514B-157(a), costs and reasonable fees the association incurs collecting delinquent assessments, foreclosing a lien or enforcing the documents are payable on demand — but if the claims the association acted on are not substantiated, the association pays the other side’s costs and fees instead. An owner whose claim against the association is substantiated recovers; an owner whose claim is not pays the association’s fees unless the owner first submitted the claim to mediation or to arbitration under subpart D and made a good faith effort to resolve it (§ 514B-157(b)). Chapter 421J does the same on a prevailing-party test, with the exception extended to an action filed in small claims court or a claim first taken to mediation under § 421J-13 (§ 421J-10(b)). In a foreclosure, “[t]he reasonableness of any attorney’s fees… shall be determined by the court” (§ 421J-10(a)).

This is a two-part rule where neither half means much alone.

Chapter 480 declares that “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful” (§ 480-2(a)). But it then restricts who may enforce the deceptive-practices half: “No person other than a consumer, the attorney general or the director of the office of consumer protection may bring an action based upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices declared unlawful by this section” (§ 480-2(d)). Anyone may sue on unfair methods of competition (§ 480-2(e)), but that is a different claim.

So whether an association can use chapter 480 turns on whether it is a consumer. Section 514B-104(a)(4) answers it directly. Among the association’s powers is instituting, defending or intervening in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting the condominium — and then: “For the purposes of actions under chapter 480, associations shall be deemed to be ‘consumers’”. Without that sentence § 480-2(d) would shut the door.

Two consequences worth knowing. A contract or agreement in violation of chapter 480 “is void and is not enforceable at law or in equity” (§ 480-12). And on the foreclosure side, § 667-60 makes a list of violations by a foreclosing mortgagee an unfair or deceptive act or practice under § 480-2, with title avoidable under § 480-12 only for the violations in § 667-60(a)(1) to (9), only where shown to be substantial and material, and never for a § 667-56(5) short-sale violation — plus a sixty-day window from recordation of the affidavit to void a transfer under a Part II power-of-sale foreclosure. Note the addressee there: § 667-60 is written against a foreclosing mortgagee, and the association counterpart § 667-104 is not framed that way. See chapter 667.

Every condominium managing agent must be either a licensed real estate broker in compliance with chapter 467 or a corporation authorised to do business under article 8 of chapter 412; must register with the commission for a biennial period ending December 31 of an even-numbered year — though § 514B-132(d) exempts active real estate brokers licensed and in compliance under chapter 467, which is a large share of them; and must keep a fidelity bond of $500 per unit managed, with a floor of $20,000 and a ceiling of $500,000 (§ 514B-132(a)(1) to (3)). Only employees covered by that bond may handle association funds, except principals who cannot be covered; an agent unable to obtain a bond may seek an exemption from the commission. Every managing agent “shall be considered a fiduciary with respect to any property managed by that managing agent” (§ 514B-132(c)).

If the fraud or dishonesty of a managing agent’s employees causes an association a loss, the managing agent must act promptly and diligently to recover from the fidelity bond and apply the proceeds to reduce the loss, dividing them proportionally where more than one association is hit — and an association may ask a court to order the managing agent to do so (§ 514B-132(a)(4)).

Where the bond is not enough, there is a second source most owners have never heard of. The association may recover by court order from the real estate recovery fund established under § 467-16, provided the loss was caused by the fraud, misrepresentation or deceit of the managing agent or its employees, the managing agent is a licensed real estate broker, and the association meets the requirements of §§ 467-16 and 467-18 (§ 514B-132(a)(4)).

The fund’s own limits matter. It pays not more than $25,000 per transaction for damages sustained by fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, including court costs, fees set by law and reasonable attorney fees as the court determines (§ 467-16(a)). If the fund is short, claims are paid in the order filed once money is deposited, with six per cent interest (§ 467-18(f)). An action that may result in collection from the fund must be started no later than two years from the accrual of the cause of action, and the commission must be notified in writing when the action is commenced (§ 467-18(a)). Recovery requires a final judgment and proof that the claimant has searched for and exhausted the debtor’s assets (§ 467-18(b), (c)). One consequence for the licensee: when the fund pays, the broker’s or salesperson’s licence is automatically terminated, and no new licence issues for at least five years and until the amount is repaid with interest (§ 467-18(e)).

Condominiums. Mediation is mandatory on written request where the dispute is between a unit owner and the board, a unit owner and the managing agent, board members and the board, or directors and managing agents and the board, and involves the interpretation or enforcement of the declaration, bylaws or house rules, falls outside the exclusions, has not already been mediated, and no action or arbitration has begun (§ 514B-161(a)). It is not mandatory where the dispute involves threatened property damage or health and safety, assessments, personal injury, or matters affecting insurance coverage (§ 514B-161(b)). A party may apply to the circuit court to compel mediation once forty-five days have passed without agreement on a mediator and a date, and the prevailing party on that application is awarded fees capped at $1,500 (§ 514B-161(d), (e)). Mediation supported from the condominium education trust fund carries a $375 fee from each party and no more than $3,000 total from the fund (§ 514B-161(g)).

Arbitration is available at any party’s request for disputes about the interpretation, application or enforcement of the chapter or the governing documents, under the commission’s rules and chapter 658A — and “where any arbitration rule conflicts with chapter 658A, chapter 658A shall prevail” (§ 514B-162(a)). Eight categories are carved out, including actions to collect assessments that are liens or subject to foreclosure — though an owner who pays in full and meets § 514B-146 keeps the right to demand arbitration of the amount and validity of the assessment (§ 514B-162(b)(5)).

Planned communities have mediation only. Section 421J-13 makes mediation the first step at any party’s request, with four exclusions — equitable relief involving threatened property damage or health and safety, actions to collect assessments, personal injury claims, and claims over $2,500 where pursuing mediation would make insurance coverage unavailable — and provides that if a mediation is not completed within two months of commencement, no further mediation is required unless the parties agree. There is no arbitration section in chapter 421J.

What happens to an award. Chapter 658A supplies the court machinery § 514B-162(f) points at. A party may move to confirm, and the court “shall issue a confirming order” unless the award is modified, corrected or vacated (§ 658A-22). Vacatur is available on six grounds — corruption, fraud or other undue means; evident partiality, corruption or prejudicial misconduct by an arbitrator; refusal to postpone on sufficient cause or to consider material evidence; the arbitrator exceeding their powers; no agreement to arbitrate; or want of proper notice — and a motion must be filed within ninety days of notice of the award — or, where the ground alleged is corruption, fraud or other undue means, within ninety days after that ground is known or would have been known with reasonable care (§ 658A-23(a), (b)). The court may modify or correct for an evident mathematical miscalculation or mistake of description, an award on a claim not submitted, or imperfection in form not affecting the merits, again on ninety days (§ 658A-24(a)).

And a condominium arbitration is not the end of the road. Section 514B-163(a) provides that submitting a dispute to arbitration under § 514B-162 “shall in no way limit or abridge the right of any party to a trial de novo” — but the deadlines are short and unforgiving: written demand on the other parties within ten days after service of the award, and filing in circuit court within thirty days of the demand, with failure to meet either precluding the demand (§ 514B-163(b)). The award is not made known to the trier of fact (§ 514B-163(c)). And the risk is real: a party who demands a trial de novo and does not prevail “shall be charged with all reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees of the trial” (§ 514B-163(d)).

One caution taken from the Code itself. The Hawaii Revised Statutes print § 514B-161 with a revisor’s note reading “Repeal and reenactment on June 30, 2023. L 2018, c 196, §9.” and § 514B-162.5 — voluntary binding arbitration, which carries a $175 fee from each party and up to $6,000 from the education trust fund after evaluative mediation — with a note reading “Section effective January 2, 2019, and repealed June 30, 2023. L 2018, c 196, §9.” Which text of those two sections is currently operative cannot be resolved from the published chapter alone, so we do not state one. Check the current session laws or ask a Hawaii attorney before relying on either.

Both association chapters carry the mechanism, with wording that differs in three places. If an owner who rents out the unit is thirty days or more in default — on common expenses in a condominium (§ 514B-145(a)), on regular assessments in a planned community (§ 421J-10.6(a)) — the board may demand in writing and receive from the tenant or rental agent an amount sufficient to pay what the owner owes. In a condominium that is each month, capped at the tenant’s rent due each month; in a planned community it is each rental period as the lease provides, capped at the rent due at the time of demand. The tenant’s payment discharges that much of the rent obligation, and “any contractual provision to the contrary shall be void as a matter of law” (§ 421J-10.6(a); § 514B-145).

Three protections travel with it. The board must first send the owner written notice of its intent, by both first-class and certified mail, stating the exact amount claimed (§ 421J-10.6(b)). The owner may not retaliate against the tenant (§ 421J-10.6(c)), and the tenant’s payment is a complete defence, to the extent paid, in an action by the owner for non-payment of rent (§ 421J-10.6(d)). The board may not make the demand at all where a commissioner or receiver has been appointed pending a mortgage foreclosure, a mortgagee is in possession, or the tenant is under a court order to pay a third party (§ 421J-10.6(e)). And before using the power the board must adopt a written policy and have it approved — in a condominium by a majority vote of the unit owners at a meeting or the written consent of a majority of the unit owners (§ 514B-145(g)); in a planned community by a majority of those present in person or by proxy, or written consent of a voting interest equal to a quorum, unless the association documents already permit the process (§ 421J-10.6(g)).

The tenant keeps their landlord-tenant rights. Where the section conflicts with chapter 521, the section wins — except that “if the tenant is entitled to an offset of rent under chapter 521, the tenant may deduct the offset from the amount due to the association, up to the limits stated in chapter 521” (§ 421J-10.6(f); § 514B-145(f)).

Those limits are in § 521-64. Where a landlord fails to commence repairs of a health or safety violation within seven calendar days of official notification, or of a defective condition within twelve business days of the tenant’s written notice, the tenant may have the work done and, on producing receipts, deduct from rent “not more than $1,000 or one month’s rent, whichever is greater” for the actual expenditure (§ 521-64(b), (d)) — and repairs to electrical, plumbing or other facilities necessary for sanitary and habitable conditions must be commenced within three business days of notification (§ 521-64(c)). Across each six-month period the total chargeable to the landlord under the section may not exceed three months’ rent (§ 521-64(e)). The tenant must list every known non-complying condition at the time of the initial notice or be estopped from having it corrected at the landlord’s expense for six months (§ 521-64(e)), and cannot repair at the landlord’s expense where the condition was caused by want of due care by the tenant or their household (§ 521-64(f)).

Both association statutes point at this section — § 514B-106.5 for condominiums and § 421J-15 for planned communities — and it imposes a duty most boards do not know they have.

Each board of an association governed by chapter 514B, a cooperative housing corporation governed by chapter 421I, or a planned community association governed by chapter 421J shall establish a policy, if entry to the property is inaccessible to the general public, to provide reasonable access to persons authorised to serve civil process on someone identified by the documents as residing or present there (§ 634-21.5(a)).

The policy has five required elements: access to common areas adjacent to the principal entry of the named residence, for the sole purpose of attempting service; a requirement that the server present clear personal identification and evidence of authority, including documentation showing the precise name, address and unit number of the person to be served; the right to deny access where that identification and documentation cannot be produced; conditions of time and manner, with power to require a server who breaches them to leave immediately; and the designation, by title or position, of an individual generally available during normal business hours to respond — plus at least one alternate (§ 634-21.5(b)).

The association is protected on both sides. It “shall not be liable” to any person if, after access is allowed, service is not actually effected for whatever reason; nor to a person upon whom service is actually effected in accordance with the chapter (§ 634-21.5(c)).

There is a publication duty too. A condominium board must identify its designees in its biennial registration; a cooperative housing corporation or planned community association must keep a printed copy of the policy available at all times at the principal point of entry (§ 634-21.5(d)).