Georgia related & miscellaneous statutes

Georgia’s general rule cuts covenants short. Covenants restricting land to certain uses “shall not run for more than 20 years” in municipalities that have adopted zoning laws, or in county areas for which zoning laws have been adopted (§ 44-5-60(b)). There is one carve-out written into the same subsection: where a zoning ordinance, on its initial enactment, expressly acknowledged the continuing application of a covenant created before that jurisdiction adopted zoning, the covenant continues until it expires by its own terms.

But most subdivisions never reach that cliff. Covenants affecting planned subdivisions containing no fewer than 15 individual plots automatically renew for further 20 year periods, and there is no limit on the number of renewals (§ 44-5-60(d)(1)). Renewal is the default; termination takes work. To stop it, at least 51 percent of the owners of affected plots must execute a document containing a legal description of the whole affected area, a list of the names of all record owners, and a description of the covenant, each signer verifying that he or she is a record owner — recorded with the superior court clerk no sooner than, but within, the two years before an expiry date (§ 44-5-60(d)(2)).

A separate 20 year limit sits in § 44-5-59 for covenants between an owner and a third party: such a covenant runs with the land only where it is supported by consideration, appears in a duly recorded instrument in the applicable chain of title, adequately describes the property, and does not run for more than 20 years. Covenants recorded on property solely by the property’s owner are expressly excluded from § 44-5-59’s conditions and run with the title — which takes them outside this section, not outside the 20 year rule and renewal machinery in § 44-5-60.

And none of the 20 year machinery applies to the two statutory regimes. Section 44-3-116 disapplies § 44-5-60(b) and paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of § 44-5-60(d) to covenants in any condominium instrument created under the Condominium Act; § 44-3-234 does the same for covenants in any instrument created pursuant to or submitted pursuant to the Property Owners’ Association Act — wording that expressly reaches a development which amended its way in. Covenants in those communities are not on a clock at all.

This is the sharpest divide in Georgia community-association law, and it is the one most likely to be carried across wrongly.

General covenant law protects the owner: “no change in the covenants which imposes a greater restriction on the use or development of the land will be enforced unless agreed to in writing by the owner of the affected property at the time such change is made” (§ 44-5-60(d)(4)). On its face that answers the annual-meeting question — a newly adopted ban on something you already do is not enforceable against you unless you signed up to it.

Except that paragraph (4) is one of the paragraphs §§ 44-3-116 and 44-3-234 switch off. In a condominium, or in a community that affirmatively elected into the POA Act, the written-consent protection is simply not available. An amendment adopted the way the instrument and the Act allow — in a POA Act community, the agreement of lot owners holding two-thirds of the votes, or a larger majority if the instrument specifies — and, during any option to add property or any declarant control period, the declarant’s agreement as well (§ 44-3-226(a)(1)) — can impose a restriction that did not exist when you bought. The instrument cannot set the bar arbitrarily high: no amendment may require approval of owners holding more than 80 percent of the association vote together with mortgagees holding 80 percent of the voting interest of mortgaged lots (§ 44-3-226(b)).

The one greater-restriction veto that survives in the POA Act belongs to the declarant, not to you: while the declarant still owns at least one lot primarily for sale, no amendment imposing a greater restriction on the declarant’s own use or development may be made without the declarant’s written agreement (§ 44-3-226(a)(2)(A)). Two owner-side protections do survive in the same section, though: no amendment may prohibit or restrict a nonowner occupied lot from continuing to be leased for an initial term of six months or longer under the pre-amended instrument, until a conveyance for value (§ 44-3-226(a)(2)(B)); and no amendment may change a lot’s boundaries, votes or share of common expenses without the agreement of all lot owners and all mortgagees (§ 44-3-226(c)). And challenges get harder with time — the adoption of an amendment is presumed valid if suit is commenced more than one year after it was recorded, with the burden on the challenger (§ 44-3-226(f)).

So the answer to “can they add this rule and make it stick?” is no in a subdivision that never elected in, and yes, if they follow the documents in the other two.

The two Georgia decisions that turn on exactly this line: Charter Club on River Home Owners Ass’n v. Walker, 689 S.E.2d 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)↗, holding that under § 44-5-60(d)(4) an owner who has not consented in writing to an amendment imposing a new, more restrictive covenant is not required to follow it, even where the amendment was adequately enacted under the declaration’s own amendment provision; and Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 747 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)↗, holding that an amendment imposing a new restrictive covenant required approval by at least two-thirds of the homeowners, the association there having elected to be subject to the POA Act.

Most Georgia subdivisions are governed by their own recorded covenants and by § 44-5-60 — not by the POA Act. That does not leave them without machinery.

In a planned subdivision of no fewer than 15 individual plots, every owner and everyone entitled to occupy the property shall comply with all lawful provisions of the covenants. Non-compliance grounds an action to recover sums due, for damages, for injunctive relief, or for any other remedy at law or in equity, maintainable by a homeowners’ association or other common interest community association created under those covenants — and the association may pursue injunctive relief without first pursuing or using any other remedy, regardless of whether other remedies exist or would be adequate. To the extent provided in the instrument, it may impose fines and temporarily suspend voting rights and the use of common areas and services paid for as a common expense; but no suspension may deny an owner or occupant access to the property (§ 44-5-60(d)(6)).

Two boundaries in the same paragraph are worth quoting back at anyone who overstates it. Nothing in it renders covenants in a subdivision of fewer than 15 plots unenforceable; and nothing in the subsection limits or expands rights that owners or associations otherwise have under Georgia law or their governing instruments, except as the paragraph expressly states.

Two more provisions matter here. No covenant that prohibits the use or ownership of property within the subdivision may discriminate based on race, creed, colour, age, sex, or national origin (§ 44-5-60(d)(3)). And to the extent provided in the covenants, the obligation to pay assessments and fees includes the costs of collection, including reasonable attorney’s fees actually incurred (§ 44-5-60(e)) — note “actually incurred”, and note that it depends on the covenants saying so.

Georgia gives owners a named remedy when the entity enforcing the covenants goes dormant, and the trigger list is specific. In a planned subdivision of no fewer than 15 plots, control of that entity may pass to the plot owners if it fails to do any of the following: “Incorporate or maintain an annual registration pursuant to the terms of the covenants”; cause directors to be appointed and officers elected under the covenants; maintain and make available on written request a list of the names and business or home addresses of its current directors and officers; call meetings in accordance with the covenants; prepare an annual operating budget, establish the annual assessment and distribute both no later than 30 days after the beginning of the fiscal year; or pay property taxes on common property for two or more years (§ 44-5-60(d)(5)(A)).

The procedure: any plot owner, alone or with others, sends written notice of the failure by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery to the entity’s principal office, giving 30 days to cure. If it does not cure, any owner has standing individually, and not solely through a derivative action, to bring an action in the superior court for a declaratory judgment granting owners control — the court may order an election and set its terms, may rule summarily on the conveyance of intended common areas, and if the owners prevail shall award all reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Discovery happens only if the court orders it for good cause (§ 44-5-60(d)(5)(B)). In a POA Act community the parallel route against a declarant that will not do its job is § 44-3-232.1.

The registration limb connects to real corporate consequences. Under the Nonprofit Corporation Code, the Secretary of State may administratively dissolve a corporation that does not deliver its annual registration within 60 days after it is due, or that is without a registered agent or office for 60 days or more (§ 14-3-1420). It gets written notice and 60 days to correct (§ 14-3-1421), and once dissolved it continues to exist but may not carry on any business except winding up. Reinstatement is available within five years and, once effective, relates back as if the dissolution had never occurred (§ 14-3-1422).

Georgia has a condominium regime that predates the one everyone cites, and it was never repealed.

Section 44-3-113 draws the line by date. The Georgia Condominium Act applies to property submitted to it, and also to a condominium created before October 1, 1975 under the “Apartment Ownership Act” only if the instruments creating it were amended, in accordance with their terms, to submit it (§ 44-3-113(a)). Such a condominium may amend in to take the benefit of the modern Act, but any amendment must conform the instruments to the article in all necessary respects, and only then is it deemed submitted (§ 44-3-113(b)). The same subsection closes both ends: no condominium could be established under the Apartment Ownership Act on or after October 1, 1975, and nothing in the article affects the validity of any provision of any instrument recorded before that date.

So what governs a 1968 Atlanta building whose owners never amended? The 1963 Act — which is still law. When Georgia adopted the current Code, § 1-1-10 repealed the 1933 Code and essentially all general laws enacted before June 1, 1981, but listed specific laws saved from repeal, and item (55) of that list is “An Act to be known as the ‘Apartment Ownership Act,’ approved April 12, 1963 (Ga. L. 1963, p. 561), as amended”, which § 1-1-10(c) says “shall remain of full force and effect, pursuant to their terms, until otherwise repealed, amended, superseded, or declared invalid or unconstitutional”.

The practical point for an owner or a buyer in an older Georgia building: the declaration’s recording date decides which statute you are reading. A pre-October 1975 condominium that never amended in is not governed by O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-70 through 44-3-117, and advice drawn from the modern Act may simply not apply to it. The 1963 Act is not part of the Official Code and is not reproduced on this site.

Every covenant, easement and lien discussed on this site depends on the recording rules, and the operative sentence is short. Deeds, mortgages and liens required by law to be recorded, as against the interests of third parties who have acquired a transfer or lien binding the same property and who are acting in good faith and without notice, “shall take effect only from the time they are filed for record in the clerk’s office” (§ 44-2-2(c)). An unrecorded interest can be worth nothing the day the burdened owner sells.

The clerk of the superior court is required to file, index and permanently record deeds, mortgages, liens provided for by law, maps or plats relating to real estate in the county, and state tax executions (§ 44-2-2(b)(1)). Electronic filing must be offered for all of those, and since January 1, 2025 a “self-filer” must file electronically — a self-filer being a party to the instrument who is not a title-insurance agent, a Georgia attorney or an attorney’s representative, a licensed real-estate professional, a bank or credit-union agent, a mortgage lender’s or servicer’s agent, a government official acting officially, or a licensed land surveyor in good standing (§ 44-2-2(a), (d)). Clerks must also make a public computer terminal available giving access to the state filing portal (§ 44-2-2(e)).

Two saving provisions worth knowing. A wrong or missing tax parcel identification number does not void the instrument, affect its validity, enforceability or priority, or affect any notice its recording gives (§ 44-2-2(f)). And nothing in the section affects validity, enforceability or priority as between the parties to the instrument themselves (§ 44-2-2(g)) — recording protects you against strangers to the deal, not against your own counterparty.

The condominium article leans on this directly: an association acting as attorney in fact for all unit owners gets effective record notice against third parties by recording in the association’s own name, without listing the owners, notwithstanding § 44-2-2 (§ 44-3-106(b)).

Georgia’s disability chapter defines a “service dog” as a domestic canine individually trained to do work or perform tasks that directly assist a physically or mentally impaired person and directly relate to that person’s specific disability and to take a specific action when needed — or one still in training under a trainer’s guidance. The definition then excludes, in terms, “a dog that has not been trained to do a specific job or task or that solely provides comfort, companionship, or emotional support to a person, regardless of such person’s disability status” (§ 30-4-1(5)).

Read that exclusion for what it is. It settles the meaning of “service dog” in this Georgia chapter. It does not decide whether an association must accommodate an assistance animal under fair-housing law, which is a different statute and a different test: § 8-3-202(a)(7)(B) makes it discriminatory to refuse reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services where necessary to afford a disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, and § 8-3-223 provides that compliance with the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 is deemed compliance with that paragraph and that the federal Act prevails on any conflict about the treatment of persons with disabilities. A board that refuses an animal on the ground that Georgia law does not treat emotional support animals as service dogs has answered the wrong question. See the Georgia Fair Housing Act.

What chapter 30-4 does give, in housing: a physically or mentally impaired person is entitled to rent, lease or purchase all housing accommodations offered for compensation as other members of the general public, and a person who has or obtains a service dog — and a person training one — has full and equal access and shall not be required to pay extra compensation for the dog, while remaining liable for any damage the dog does to the premises (§ 30-4-3(a), (b)). The balancing provision is § 30-4-3(c): nothing in that section requires a person providing property for compensation to modify the property in any way or to provide a higher degree of care than for a person who is not impaired. “Housing accommodations” excludes a single-family residence whose occupants rent out no more than one room (§ 30-4-1(2)).

A trainer engaged in owner training, or identified as an agent or employee of a school for service dogs, has the same right as the impaired person with no further conditions (§ 30-4-2(b)(2)). A person raising a dog for training, and an impaired person owner-training their own dog, have that right subject to five conditions — notifying an onsite manager, liability for damage, control by harness, leash or tether — and where a disability or the dog’s work makes that impracticable, control by voice, signals or other effective means instead, the dog being at least six months old and reliably housebroken, and wearing apparel identifying it as in training (§ 30-4-2(b)(3)). Dogs in training have the same rights and protections as working service dogs (§ 30-4-2(d)). Denying or interfering with those rights is a misdemeanour of a high and aggravated nature, punishable by a fine up to $2,000.00, up to 30 days’ confinement, or both — and so is deliberately misrepresenting yourself as qualified to use, train or raise a service dog to obtain accommodations (§ 30-4-4).

The Georgia Fair Housing Act routes complaints to an administrator (§ 8-3-208(a)); where no election is made to go to court they are referred to an administrative law judge of the Office of State Administrative Hearings (§ 8-3-213(e)(1)). A separate body, defined by reference out of the Act, sits behind the administrator in an advisory role: the Board of Commissioners of the Commission on Equal Opportunity, created by § 45-19-23 — a body of nine members appointed by the Governor subject to Senate confirmation, serving three-year staggered terms.

Two composition requirements are unusual enough to be worth knowing. The membership must be representative of a fair and reasonable cross section of the population of the state, and one-third of the members must have experience in labour or Title VII law enforcement or other legal human rights experience. Since July 1, 1993, at least three members must be representative of, or have a background in, realty, apartment management, or the building and contracting industry (§ 45-19-23(a)).

The board elects a chair annually and meets at least three times a year; members serve without pay, with expense and travel reimbursement for those who are not otherwise state officials or employees (§ 45-19-23(b)). It must report in writing to the Governor and the General Assembly by December 31 each year (§ 45-19-23(c)), and it assists the administrator in an advisory capacity (§ 45-19-23(d)). It also certifies annually a list of at least eight Georgia lawyers, including women and minorities, experienced in labour, employment or administrative law, from which the Governor selects special masters on the basis of rotation in sequential order — but note that § 45-19-23(e) ties that list to special masters appointed under the fair employment practices article in which § 45-19-23 sits, not to fair housing hearings, which go to an OSAH administrative law judge.

Georgia’s nonprofit standards of conduct are not the only protection a board member has. Section 51-1-20(a) gives immunity from civil liability to a person serving with or without compensation as a member, director or trustee, or as an officer of the board without compensation, of a nonprofit hospital or association, of a nonprofit, charitable or eleemosynary institution or organisation, or of a local governmental agency, board, authority or entity — for any act or omission arising out of that service, if the person was acting in good faith within the scope of his or her official actions and duties, and unless the damage or injury was caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of that person.

Two definitional points sit with it. “Compensation” does not include reimbursement for reasonable expenses related to the service (§ 51-1-20(b)) — so a director who is reimbursed for mileage is still uncompensated for this purpose. And the immunity is supplemental: it does not affect any immunity arising from any other source, and a person may hold both (§ 51-1-20(c)).

The Nonprofit Corporation Code preserves it expressly. Section 14-3-830(d)(5) provides that nothing in the directors’ standard-of-conduct section shall deprive a director of the applicability, effect or protection of Code Section 51-1-20; § 14-3-830(d)(4) does the same for the business judgment rule. Whether a particular Georgia association falls within § 51-1-20’s description is a question about that association — the statute lists the kinds of body it covers, and this page does not decide where any given community sits.

Both community-association statutes use the same sentence about proxies: “No such proxy shall be revocable except as provided in Code Section 14-2-722 or 14-3-724 or by written notice delivered to the association”, and a proxy is void if it is not dated, or if it purports to be revocable without such notice (§§ 44-3-79(c), 44-3-224(b)). The cross-reference points at two different chapters because §§ 44-3-100(a) and 44-3-227(a) let an association incorporate under either.

The two are not the same rule. Under § 14-2-722(d), a business-corporation proxy is revocable “unless the appointment form or electronic transmission states that it is irrevocable and the appointment is coupled with an interest” — and the section lists five such interests, including a pledgee, a person who purchased or agreed to purchase the shares, a creditor whose credit terms required the appointment, an employee whose contract required it, and a party to a voting agreement. Under § 14-3-724(d) there is no irrevocability route at all: a nonprofit proxy is simply “revocable by the member.”

Duration differs too. Both default to 11 months, but a business-corporation appointment may be given only a longer express period (§ 14-2-722(c)), while a nonprofit appointment may be given a different one, longer or shorter (§ 14-3-724(c)). Both are effective when the signed form or electronic transmission reaches the officer or agent authorised to tabulate votes.

Before relying on any of it, read the articles of incorporation to see which chapter your association was formed under. Copies must be kept at the principal and registered offices and furnished to any owner on request for a reasonable charge (§§ 44-3-100(c), 44-3-227(c)).

When an apartment building is converted to a condominium, tenants get a statutory notice. Section 44-3-87(g) adds a consequence that is easy to miss: if the notice of conversion specifies a date by which the unit must be vacated, “the notice will also constitute demand for possession pursuant to Code Section 44-7-50.” One document does two jobs.

That matters because § 44-7-50 is the first step of Georgia’s dispossessory procedure. Where a tenant holds over beyond the term, or holds at will or sufferance, the owner may demand possession personally or through an agent, attorney at law or attorney in fact; if the tenant refuses or fails to deliver possession when demanded, the owner may immediately go before a superior or state court judge, a clerk or deputy clerk of either, a judge or clerk of any other court with jurisdiction, or a magistrate in the district where the land lies, and make an affidavit under oath to the facts — which may also be sworn before a notary public (§ 44-7-50(a)).

Where the complaint is unpaid rent rather than holding over, the route is different: the tenant must first be given a notice to vacate or pay all past due rent, late fees, utilities and other charges within three business days, and only on refusal or failure may the affidavit be made (§ 44-7-50(c)). Either notice must be posted in a sealed envelope conspicuously on the door of the property and delivered by any additional method agreed in the rental agreement (§ 44-7-50(d)). A public housing authority may give the demand concurrently with the federally required lease-termination notice, in a separate writing (§ 44-7-50(b)).

Version note. The text described here is the one in force, printed “Effective until January 1, 2027”. A later version of § 44-7-50 exists and takes effect on that date; anything read here should be re-checked against the current text after it does.

Buyers who discover an unexpected covenant, easement or encumbrance after closing usually ask what their deed promised. Georgia answers in seven short sections, and the first is the one that surprises people: “In a sale of land there is no implied warranty of title” (§ 44-5-61). Whatever protection exists comes from what the deed expressly says.

Where the deed does contain one, a general warranty of title against the claims of all persons includes covenants of a right to sell, of quiet enjoyment, and of freedom from encumbrances (§ 44-5-62). And it is broader than many assume: in a deed, a general warranty covers defects in the title even if they were known to the purchaser when the deed was taken (§ 44-5-63).

On a claim, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, except where outstanding encumbrances have been paid off, or possession has been yielded as a consequence of legal proceedings of which the warrantor had notice and an opportunity to defend (§ 44-5-64). The warrantee need not offer to rescind the deed in order to recover, though an offer by the warrantor to rescind and a refusal by the warrantee should be considered in estimating damages (§ 44-5-65).

Damages for breach of a covenant of warranty are the purchase money with interest from the time of sale, unless the jury finds that the use of the premises equalled the interest and that an equitable setoff should be allowed — but if valuable improvements have been made, the interest should be allowed (§ 44-5-66). On breach of a bond for title, the measure is instead the value of the premises at the time of the breach with interest, reduced to actual damage sustained where the vendee has bought up the outstanding title (§ 44-5-67).

The Georgia Installment Loan Act turns up on HOA pages across the internet, usually as though it regulated assessment collection. It does not. The Act licenses the business of making installment loans, and an “installment loan” is a contract or agreement to make a loan to an individual in an amount of $3,000.00 or less, including any renewal or refinancing (§ 7-3-3(7)). No person may engage in that business without a licence unless exempt (§ 7-3-4(a)).

An assessment levied under a declaration is not a loan to an individual. It is a charge the recorded instrument imposes on the lot, which is why the Act is not the law an association is acting under when it collects one, and why a licence question does not arise. Two details are also commonly stated wrongly: the threshold is $3,000.00 or less — not, as it is often rendered, a figure strictly under $3,000 — and since July 1, 2020 the Act is administered by the Department of Banking and Finance, not the Commissioner of Insurance (§ 7-3-2).

Collection conduct is governed at the federal level instead, by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which prohibits debt collectors from using abusive, unfair or deceptive practices. HOA fees are “debts” under the FDCPA and homeowners are protected “consumers”. Complaints go to the Georgia Department of Law Consumer Protection Division↗, the FTC↗ or the CFPB↗, and a victim may sue a debt collector in state or federal court within one year of the violation.