Miscellaneous & related Connecticut laws

The Community Association Managers chapter ends its penalty section with a sentence that is easy to read past: “A violation of any of the provisions of sections 20-450 to 20-462, inclusive, shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive trade practice under subsection (a) of section 42-110b” (§ 20-457(b)). That deeming is worth understanding, because the statute it points to carries remedies chapter 400b does not.

The prohibition is broad and deliberately open-ended. Section 42-110b(a): “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Subsection (b) directs the commissioner and the courts to be guided by the Federal Trade Commission’s and the federal courts’ interpretations of Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and subsection (d) declares the chapter remedial and to be construed as such. “Person” at § 42-110a(3) expressly includes an incorporated or unincorporated association.

What a private action gets you (§ 42-110g). Anyone who suffers “any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal” as a result of a prohibited practice may sue for actual damages, and the section says in terms that “proof of public interest or public injury shall not be required” — a point that used to defeat cases. The court may award punitive damages in its discretion and grant equitable relief.

The fee provision is the part practitioners watch. Section 42-110g(d) lets the court award “costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery” — and in a class action producing non-monetary relief, fees may still be awarded. That decouples the fee from the size of the loss, which is what makes a modest individual claim viable at all.

Three limits to note. The action must be brought within three years of the occurrence of a violation (§ 42-110g(f)) — from the violation, not from discovery. The plaintiff must mail a copy of the complaint to the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Consumer Protection on commencement, and a copy of any judgment on entry (§ 42-110g(c)). And there is a right to a jury trial except as to punitive damages, costs, attorney’s fees and injunctive or equitable relief (§ 42-110g(g)).

The exemption, and who has to prove it. Section 42-110c(a)(1) exempts “transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority” — and § 42-110c(b) puts the burden of proving the exemption on the person claiming it.

One thing the text does not answer. Whether an association’s own conduct toward its members is “trade or commerce” — defined at § 42-110a(4) as the advertising, sale, rent, lease, offering or distribution of services and property — is not settled by the words of the statute, and this page does not guess at it. The clear case is the one § 20-457(b) creates: a registered manager who breaches chapter 400b.

Owners who hear that Connecticut outlawed private transfer fees in 2013 sometimes conclude the fee their association charges at closing is illegal. It is not, and the statute says so by name.

The ban. On and after June 24, 2013, no person may impose a private transfer fee obligation; any such obligation and any agreement violating the subsection is void and unenforceable, and a person aggrieved by one may bring a civil action for damages in the Superior Court (§ 47-17a(b)). A private transfer fee is a fee payable on the conveyance and subsequent conveyance of an interest in real property, or for the right to make or accept one (§ 47-17a(a)(2)(A)).

The carve-out that matters here. Section 47-17a(a)(2)(B)(vii) excludes from the definition “any dues, assessment, fine, contribution, fee, charge or other amount payable to an association or a unit owners’ association of a common interest community as defined by chapter 828, pursuant to any declaration, covenant, law, association bylaw, association rule or association regulation, including a fee or charge payable to such association for an estoppel letter or certificate issued by such association or its authorized agent.” That reaches the resale certificate charge as squarely as it reaches assessments and fines.

Eight other exclusions sit alongside it, including broker commissions, lender fees, landlord consent fees, government charges, and amounts payable to a 26 USC 501(c) organisation under a covenant encumbering a neighbourhood for cultural, educational, charitable, recreational, environmental or conservation purposes (§ 47-17a(a)(2)(B)(viii)).

If an obligation predates the ban, two things are required. A sale contract for property encumbered by a pre-2013 private transfer fee obligation must disclose it, describe it, and state that such obligations are subject to this section; a contract that does not is void and unenforceable, the purchaser owes no damages, and the purchaser is entitled to the return of all deposits (§ 47-17a(c)). Separately, the payee had to record a “Notice of Private Transfer Fee Obligation” in not less than fourteen-point bold type before December 31, 2013, stating the amount or method of calculation and, for residential property, actual dollar-cost examples at $250,000, $500,000 and $750,000 (§ 47-17a(d)).

And if the payee did not do its part, the fee can fall away. Property encumbered by a pre-ban obligation may become unencumbered where the payee failed to meet all the subsection (d)(1) requirements before December 31, 2013, or fails to give a grantor a written statement of the fee payable within thirty days of a written request. The grantor then records an affidavit conforming to § 47-12a, is no longer subject to the obligation, and may convey free and clear of it; the recorded affidavit is prima facie evidence the request went unanswered (§ 47-17a(e)).

Older declarations and subdivision deeds in Connecticut sometimes still carry a covenant restricting ownership or occupancy by race. Since July 1, 2021 there is a statute that both voids it and gives an owner a no-cost way to mark it on the land records.

Void, and severable. An “unlawful restrictive covenant” — defined as a covenant or provision in an instrument affecting title that “purports to restrict ownership or occupancy of such real property on the basis of race” — is void (§ 47-12b(a), (b)). Crucially, voiding it does not affect the validity or enforceability of the other covenants in the instrument, or of the recorded instrument itself. A declaration does not collapse because one clause in it is void.

The filing, and it costs nothing. An owner who identifies such a covenant affecting their own property may file an affidavit under § 47-12a, or a standardised form, with the town clerk. It must identify the volume and page of the land records for the instrument containing the covenant and state that it is filed to carry out this section. The clerk records it and, so far as practicable, notates the indices. “No town clerk may assess any recording fee for the filing of such affidavit or form” (§ 47-12b(c)). The Office of Policy and Management was required to develop the standardised form, and each town clerk to make it available on the municipal web site and in the land records area, with a posted notice explaining the section (§ 47-12b(f)).

Two protections worth knowing. Failure to file the affidavit does not affect the invalidity of the covenant — it is void either way; the filing is a record-keeping act, not a cure. And a reference in a later recorded instrument, report, opinion, contract or insurance policy to “covenants, conditions, restrictions or provisions” in a previously recorded instrument does not revive, reinstate or republish an unlawful restrictive covenant, nor is the affidavit itself an encumbrance (§ 47-12b(d)).

Connecticut’s Marketable Record Title Act can extinguish interests older than a chain of title. It is the reason a very old set of subdivision restrictions is sometimes unenforceable — and the reason it sometimes is not.

The forty-year rule. A person with an unbroken chain of title to an interest in land for forty years or more has marketable record title to it, subject only to the matters in § 47-33d (§ 47-33c). That title is then taken “free and clear of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever” depending on anything that happened before the effective date of the root of title, and those prior interests are “declared to be null and void” (§ 47-33e).

The sentence that does the work. Section 47-33d(1) preserves interests arising out of the muniments forming the chain of title — “provided a general reference in the muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions or other interests created prior to the root of title are not sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates the easement, use restriction or other interest.” A deed reciting that the conveyance is “subject to restrictions of record” is a general reference. One reciting the volume and page of the declaration that created them is a specific identification.

How an interest is kept alive. By recording a verified notice of claim during the forty-year period following the root of title, setting out the nature of the claim — and “no disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone suspends the running of the forty-year period” (§ 47-33f(a)). Continuous possession by the same record owner for forty years or more can substitute for the notice (§ 47-33f(b)). Recording a notice to slander title carries its own damages provision (§ 47-33j).

What the Act never reaches. Section 47-33h excepts a lessor’s reversion; easements evidenced by a visible or buried physical facility — pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, hole, tower — “whether or not the existence of such facility is observable”; interests of the United States, the state, a political subdivision, a public service company or a natural gas company; and conservation restrictions held by a land trust or nonprofit. Use restrictions are not on that list. Adverse possession or use after the root of title, and interests recorded after it, also survive (§ 47-33d(3), (4)).

What this page will not tell you. Whether a particular community’s restrictions survived is a question about that community’s chain of title — where the root of title falls, what each deed in the chain actually recites, and whether a notice of claim was recorded. That is a title search and a lawyer’s reading of it, not a statute lookup, and nothing here should be taken as an answer for any particular declaration.

Chapter 827 is written for new construction, and its definition puts conversion condominiums squarely inside it. “Improvement” means any newly constructed single family dwelling unit, any conversion condominium unit being conveyed by the declarant, and any fixture or structure made part of it at the time of construction or conversion (§ 47-116). “Vendor” includes any declarant of a conversion condominium. “Purchaser” is correspondingly narrow — the original buyer, his heirs or designated representatives. These warranties run to the first buyer, not to someone who buys the home again later.

Four implied warranties arise in every sale of an improvement by a vendor to a purchaser: that it is free from faulty materials, constructed according to sound engineering standards, constructed in a workmanlike manner, and fit for habitation (§ 47-118(a)). They do not apply to a condition “that an inspection of the premises would reveal to a reasonably diligent purchaser at the time the contract is signed” (b). Where the purchaser makes a particular purpose known and relies on the vendor’s skill and judgment, there is a further implied warranty of fitness for that purpose (c).

Express warranties are created without the word “warranty.” A written affirmation of fact or promise, a written description including plans and specifications, or a sample or model, each made part of the basis of the bargain, creates one — and “no formal words … nor any specific intention to make a warranty shall be necessary”, though a bare statement of value or an opinion or commendation does not (§ 47-117(a), (b)).

Neither kind can be signed away by the deed. Express warranties survive the closing: “no words in the contract of sale or the deed, nor merger of the contract of sale into such deed” excludes or modifies them (§ 47-117(c)) — and § 47-118(d) says the same of implied warranties. The only route is a separate written instrument signed by the purchaser that sets out in detail the warranty being excluded, the purchaser’s consent, and the terms of the new agreement — and for implied warranties that route is available only where the improvement is already completed (§§ 47-117(c), 47-118(d)). A vendor may not evade the chapter by an intermediate transfer — it is liable to the subsequent purchaser as if it had conveyed to that purchaser directly (§ 47-119).

The clock is short. Both express and implied warranties terminate one year after delivery of the deed or after the purchaser takes possession, whichever is first — or, for an improvement not complete at delivery, one year after completion or possession, whichever is first (§§ 47-117(d), 47-118(e)). Separately, § 47-121 attaches an implied warranty of building code compliance to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for a newly constructed single-family dwelling, with a three-year limitation running from the date the certificate issued.

These stack rather than replace. Section 47-120: the warranties created by this chapter “shall be in addition to any other warranties created or implied in law.” That matters because CIOA carries its own express and implied warranties of quality at §§ 47-274 and 47-275, the rules for excluding or modifying the implied ones at § 47-276 — where no general disclaimer works against a purchaser of a residential-use unit — and a three-year limitation at § 47-277 that accrues on a common element only when that element “is completed and first used by a bona fide purchaser” — and § 47-275(g) extends the declarant’s implied warranties on the common elements to the association itself, so the board, not just an individual buyer, can sue on them. For a unit in a common interest community the CIOA warranties are usually the stronger set, and the one-year chapter 827 clock does not cut them down.

Not every private road serving a Connecticut community is a common element. Where access runs over a private appurtenant easement or right-of-way — a shared driveway, a lane serving several lots, an access strip an association’s road crosses — § 47-42f allocates the cost and supplies a remedy.

The benefited owner pays. The owner of residential real property that benefits from an easement or right-of-way whose purpose is to provide access to that property is responsible for the cost of maintaining it in good repair and of repairing or restoring any damaged portion — and the section says the duty “shall include, but not be limited to, the removal of snow” (§ 47-42f(b)).

Where several properties benefit, the split has a default. The cost is shared “pursuant to the terms of any enforceable written agreement entered into for such purpose”, and in the absence of such an agreement, in proportion to the benefit received by each property (§ 47-42f(c)). Where the section and such an agreement conflict, the agreement controls (f).

Damage is on the one who caused it. Notwithstanding the sharing rules, an owner who directly or indirectly damages any portion is solely responsible for repairing or restoring that portion (§ 47-42f(d)).

The remedy. If an owner refuses to repair damage they caused, or fails after a written demand to pay their proportion of maintenance, repair or restoration, the other benefited owners may bring an action for specific performance or contribution in the Superior Court, jointly or severally (§ 47-42f(e)). Note the written demand: it is the step that turns a dispute into a claim.

The section reaches residential real property and excludes property owned by the state or a political subdivision, and it defines “easement” as a private appurtenant easement or right-of-way (§ 47-42f(a)). Read the definition before you rely on the section. It borrows “residential real property” from § 20-311, which means one to four-family residential real estate — including a cooperative or condominium of no more than four units, and any individual unit within a “multiunit development”, itself a residential complex of at least fifty units leased or available to be leased (§ 20-311(19), (29)). A single-family lot in a planned community sits squarely inside that. A unit in an ordinary mid-sized condominium does not, and an owner there should not assume this section supplies the remedy.

The reasonable-accommodation duty that governs an owner’s own assistance animal is on the Human Rights and Opportunities page, at § 46a-64c(a)(6)(C)(ii). This section is different and sits in a different chapter: it is about guests.

The dwelling provision. A person with a disability, or a person training an animal as a service animal, is entitled to visit a dwelling as the guest of a lawful occupant accompanied by that service animal, and may keep the animal with them at all times at no extra charge, provided the animal is in their direct custody and control. No fee may be charged that is not applicable alike to all guests — and the animal’s owner is liable for any damage it does to the premises or facilities (§ 46a-44(c)). The subsection carries the same two owner-occupied exclusions as the fair housing section: a room in an owner-occupied single-family dwelling, and a unit in an owner-occupied two-family dwelling.

Public accommodations and transport are covered by subsection (b), which reaches trains and any other mode of public transportation and any place of public accommodation catering to the general public.

Interference is a crime. Anyone who intentionally interferes with the use of a service animal by a person with a disability — “including, but not limited to, any action intended to harass or annoy” that person or a trainer — or who denies the rights in subsections (b) or (c), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor, provided the person with a disability or trainer complies with subsection (b) or (c) (§ 46a-44(d)).

“Person training an animal as a service animal” is narrowly defined (§ 46a-44(a)(2)): someone employed by a service-animal training organisation who meets the criteria for membership in a professional association of such schools, is authorised to engage in designated training activities and carries photographic identification of that employment and authorisation — or a volunteer for such an organisation that authorises volunteers to raise animals to become service animals.

Related, and on the Human Rights page: § 46a-64(a)(4) and (5) cover service animals in places of public accommodation and set the limits of what staff may ask, and § 46a-64d directs the Commission to publish educational materials on the difference between service, emotional support and therapy animals and on permissible verification methods for landlords.

Chapter 828a sits immediately after CIOA and describes a different ownership model that a Connecticut buyer may encounter: the trust owns the land, the resident owns the building or unit, and a long ground lease connects them.

Purpose and powers. A community land trust must have among its purposes the holding of land and leasing it “for the purpose of preserving the long-term eligibility and accessibility of housing predominantly for very low income, low income and moderate income persons and families”, with family income determined when the lessee enters the ground lease. On top of the powers it has under the Revised Nonstock Corporation Act, it may buy, sell, mortgage and encumber land and enter renewable or self-extending ground leases with an initial term of up to ninety-nine years (§ 47-301(a)).

The governance rules are in the statute, not just the bylaws. Section 47-301(b) requires the bylaws to provide that membership is open to the general public supporting the organisation’s goals; that no more than thirty per cent of members live outside the municipality or municipalities where the trust operates; that the membership elects at least fifty-one per cent of the governing board; and that between twenty-five and forty per cent of the board are lessees, representatives elected by lessees, or residents of eligible housing on trust land — with the board appointing lessee representatives until the trust has at least five units of housing; and that any remaining board seats may be filled by appointment by elected public officials to the extent the bylaws provide.

The resale term buyers most need to understand. The ground lease must give the trust the first option to purchase any building or improvement on the land, or any condominium or cooperative unit in it, at a limited equity price set out in the ground lease (§ 47-301(c)). That formula, not the open market, is what a resident’s equity is worth on exit — which is the mechanism that keeps the housing affordable for the next buyer, and the single most important thing to read before signing.

The lease fee is set by the trust and may include property taxes and other assessments on the land, an administrative fee and a land use fee; the method of determining it must be set out in the ground lease (§ 47-301(d)). Section 47-302 provides that the ground lease interest constitutes an interest in real property, Section 47-303 requires the ground lease to carry provisions preserving long-term eligible housing and takes them outside the rule against perpetuities and the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation; § 47-304 provides that a notice of lease stating the lease includes restrictions under this chapter makes the lease deemed to contain, at a minimum, all of the § 47-303 restrictions.