Miscellaneous & related Colorado laws

Most people are pointed at CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1.5), which says an association “shall not effectively prohibit renewable energy generation devices, as defined in section 38-30-168.” Read carefully, CCIOA borrows only the definition. The operative rules live in § 38-30-168 itself, and they are considerably stronger.

The covenant is void, not merely unenforceable against a sympathetic owner. A covenant, restriction or condition in “any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale of, or any interest in, real property” that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation or use of a renewable energy generation device “is void and unenforceable” (§ 38-30-168(1)(a)). Note what that reaches — any instrument affecting an interest in real property, not just an association’s declaration.

Four device types count (§ 38-30-168(1)(b)): a solar energy device; a wind-electric generator meeting the interconnection standards in the Public Utilities Commission’s rules; a geothermal energy device; and a heat pump system. The first and fourth are defined by cross-reference to statutes HOPB does not host, and the second is qualified by reference to Public Utilities Commission rules, so nothing is asserted here about those beyond the labels the section itself uses.

The aesthetic exception is measured, not argued. Reasonable restrictions on dimensions, placement or external appearance survive — but only if they do not increase the cost of the device by more than ten percent, do not decrease its performance or efficiency by more than ten percent, and do not require a review period exceeding sixty days (§ 38-30-168(2)(a)(I)).

And this is the sentence boards miss: “If an application for installation of a renewable energy generation device is not denied or returned for modifications within sixty days, it is deemed approved.” The same subsection requires the review process to be transparent, forbids a denial that is arbitrary or capricious, and requires the basis for any denial to be described in reasonable detail. A committee that simply goes quiet has approved your system.

There is a fee-shifting provision, and it is narrow but real. In litigation over whether an increase in cost is significant for the purposes of the ten-percent test, the party that prevails on that issue is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in litigating it — without limiting fee awards on other grounds (§ 38-30-168(4)).

What the section does not give you. It confers no right to place a device on property owned by another person, on leased property without the lessor’s permission, on property that is collateral for a commercial loan without the secured party’s permission, or on a limited common element or general common element of a common interest community (§ 38-30-168(3)). Roof and yard, yes; the shared roof of a multi-unit building, no — that is a common-element question under CCIOA. Two further limits: reasonable restrictions on wind-electric generators to reduce sound interference are allowed, and must be worked out through the architectural review process with input from the person applying (§ 38-30-168(2)(c)); and bona fide safety requirements under a building code or recognised electrical safety standard are untouched (§ 38-30-168(2)(b)). The aesthetic exception does not apply to an association that includes time share units (§ 38-30-168(2)(a)(II)).

Why this matters even if CCIOA’s own renewable energy rule does not reach you. Section 38-30-168 voids the covenant on its own terms. A community sitting inside the small-community exceptions at CCIOA §§ 38-33.3-116 or 38-33.3-119 — which leave it subject only to §§ 38-33.3-105 to 107 — still has the whole of this section. So does a pre-1992 community, which also gets CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5 through § 38-33.3-117(1)(c) — the deemed approval, the ten-percent tests and the fee provision included.

Subsection (5) of the same section does for wildfire-resistant materials what subsection (1) does for renewable energy. A covenant, restriction or condition in any instrument affecting an interest in real property that explicitly or effectively prohibits or restricts the installation, use, or maintenance of fire-hardened building materials is void and unenforceable, subject only to bona fide safety requirements required by an applicable building code (§ 38-30-168(5)(a)).

What an association keeps. It may still adopt and enforce reasonable standards on the design, dimensions, placement or external appearance of fire-hardened materials used for fencing, in accordance with CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(3)(c) — which is where the practical limits sit: those standards may not raise the cost of the fencing by more than ten percent against other fire-hardened options, and an application not denied or returned within sixty days is deemed approved. It may also adopt bona fide safety requirements consistent with building codes or nationally recognised safety standards (§ 38-30-168(5)(b)(I)).

And the same property limits apply. No right is conferred to place fire-hardened materials on property owned by another, on leased property without the lessor’s permission, or on a limited or general common element (§ 38-30-168(5)(b)(II)). The definitions of “common element”, “common interest community”, “fire-hardened building materials”, “unit owner” and “unit owners’ association” are all taken straight from CCIOA (§ 38-30-168(5)(c)), so the two statutes are reading from the same dictionary.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-124(3) lets a declaration, bylaws or rules “specify situations in which disputes shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the uniform arbitration act, part 2 of article 22 of title 13”. That is the statute, and it decides far more than most owners realise.

First, check the date on the clause. Part 2 governs an agreement to arbitrate made on or after August 4, 2004. It governs an earlier agreement only if all parties agree in a record (§ 13-22-203). An arbitration clause in a 1998 declaration is not automatically running on these rules.

Who decides what. An agreement in a record to arbitrate is “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except on a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract” (§ 13-22-206(1)). The court decides whether an agreement to arbitrate exists and whether a controversy is subject to it; the arbitrator decides whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been met and whether the contract is enforceable (§ 13-22-206(2), (3)). On a motion to compel, the court decides summarily — and may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim lacks merit (§ 13-22-207(4)).

What your governing documents cannot strip out in advance. Before a controversy arises, a party may not waive or vary the right to apply for judicial relief, the validity rule, provisional remedies, subpoena and deposition powers, jurisdiction or appeals; may not unreasonably restrict notice of the initiation of arbitration; may not unreasonably restrict the arbitrator’s duty to disclose; and — the one worth remembering — may not waive the right to be represented by a lawyer at any proceeding or hearing (§ 13-22-204(2); § 13-22-216).

And a longer list can never be waived at all, including the motion to compel or stay, arbitrator immunity, confirmation of an award, vacating an award, modification or correction, and judgment on the award (§ 13-22-204(3)(a)). There is one carve-out: a “government, governmental subdivision, governmental agency, governmental instrumentality, public corporation, or any commercial entity” may waive the vacating provision, except where the award was procured by corruption or fraud (§ 13-22-204(3)(b)). Whether a homeowners association is a “commercial entity” for that purpose is not answered by the text, and HOPB does not answer it.

The arbitrator has to tell you who they know. Before accepting, after reasonable inquiry, an arbitrator must disclose to all parties any known facts a reasonable person would consider likely to affect impartiality — expressly including a financial or personal interest in the outcome and a current or previous relationship with any party, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator — and the duty continues after appointment (§ 13-22-212(1), (2)). Then the sanction: a neutral arbitrator who fails to disclose a known, direct and material interest in the outcome, or a known, existing and substantial relationship with a party, is presumed to act with evident partiality (§ 13-22-212(5)). Where an association and its law firm use the same arbitrator repeatedly, that is the provision to read.

Fees are not automatic. An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney fees and expenses only if such an award would be authorised by law in a civil action on the same claim, or by the parties’ agreement (§ 13-22-221(1)). For an assessment dispute that routes you straight back to CCIOA § 38-33.3-123 and its attorney-fee limit — the lesser of $5,000, as adjusted for inflation each August 1 since 2025 (§ 38-33.3-123(1)(g)), or fifty percent, measured against the money owed under § 38-33.3-123(1)(a)(II) or against the association’s actual costs under § 38-33.3-123(1)(c)(II) — and a court may exceed the (1)(c)(II) limit where it finds the owner was able to comply but willfully did not.

Losing is not necessarily the end — but the clock is short. A court shall vacate an award procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; where there was evident partiality by a neutral arbitrator, corruption, or misconduct prejudicing a party; where the arbitrator refused to postpone on sufficient cause or refused to consider material evidence, or otherwise ran the hearing contrary to § 13-22-215, so as to substantially prejudice a party’s rights; where the arbitrator exceeded their powers; where there was no agreement to arbitrate and the objection was raised in time; or where notice of initiation was improper and substantially prejudiced a party (§ 13-22-223(1)). But a motion to vacate must be filed within ninety-one days of receiving notice of the award — or of a corrected award — unless the ground is corruption or fraud, in which case ninety-one days runs from when it was or should have been known (§ 13-22-223(2)). Note also what is not a ground: that the relief granted “could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity” (§ 13-22-223(1.5)).

After the award. The court enters judgment on confirmation, vacatur without rehearing, modification or correction, and it is enforceable and recordable like any civil judgment; the court may add reasonable attorney fees and expenses of the post-award judicial proceeding for a prevailing party (§ 13-22-225). Appeals lie from an order denying a motion to compel, granting a stay, confirming or denying confirmation, modifying or correcting, vacating without rehearing, or from final judgment (§ 13-22-228).

CCIOA § 38-33.3-124(1)(a)(II) points associations and owners at “the resources offered by the office of dispute resolution within the Colorado judicial branch through its website”. The Dispute Resolution Act creates that office — and, critically, § 13-22-312 applies the whole Part to all mediation conducted in this state, whether through the office or through a private mediator or organisation. So these rules reach the mediation your declaration sends you to.

Confidentiality is broad and it binds everyone. No party, mediator or mediation organisation may voluntarily disclose — or be compelled through discovery or process to disclose — any mediation communication, unless all parties and the mediator consent in writing; the communication reveals an intent to commit a felony, inflict bodily harm, or threaten the safety of a child; a statute requires it be public; or disclosure is necessary to a claim of willful or wanton misconduct by the mediator (§ 13-22-307(2)). Anything disclosed in violation is not admissible in any judicial or administrative proceeding (§ 13-22-307(3)).

Two limits people get backwards. First, confidentiality does not launder evidence: nothing prevents discovery or admission of evidence that is otherwise discoverable merely because it was presented in mediation (§ 13-22-307(4)). Bringing a document to mediation does not make it privileged. Second, the deal you strike is not a mediation communication. The definition expressly excludes a written agreement to enter mediation and a fully executed final written agreement reached as a result of it, unless the parties agree otherwise (§ 13-22-302(2.5)). If you want the settlement kept private, say so in it.

How a settlement becomes enforceable. On the parties’ request a full or partial agreement is reduced to writing and approved; if written and signed it may be presented to the court as a stipulation and, if approved, is enforceable as an order of the court (§ 13-22-308(1)) — which is exactly the route CCIOA § 38-33.3-124(2)(b) contemplates.

What a mediator is and is not. A mediator is a trained neutral who assists parties to reach their own resolution (§ 13-22-302(4)); no adjudication, sanction or penalty may be imposed by a mediator or the director (§ 13-22-305(5)); and mediator liability is limited to willful or wanton misconduct (§ 13-22-305(6)). You may use the office’s services before or after an action is filed (§ 13-22-305(2)), and fees are set by supreme court order and may be waived at the director’s discretion (§ 13-22-305(3)).

If a court orders you to mediate. Any court of record may refer a case — but shall not where a party says they were the victim of physical or psychological abuse by the other party and is unwilling; and a party may object within five days of the referral order on “compelling reasons”, which the statute says may include that the costs of mediation would be higher than the requested relief. Referral does not apply in a civil action where injunctive or similar equitable relief is the only remedy sought (§ 13-22-311(1)). And the provision to remember if money is tight: “In no event shall a party be denied the right to proceed in court in the action filed because of failure to pay the mediator” (§ 13-22-311(4)).

An association holds a surprising amount about you — names, addresses, phone numbers, email, bank details for autopay, sometimes a driver’s licence for an amenity badge. Four separate rules govern what happens to it.

1. CCIOA makes some of it off-limits, full stop. Association records must be withheld from inspection to the extent they concern personnel, salary or medical records, or personal identification and account information of members and residents — bank account information, telephone numbers, email addresses, driver’s license numbers and social security numbers (§ 38-33.3-317(3.5)). This is a duty to withhold, not a discretion. You may consent in writing to publication of your phone number or email, and withdraw that consent later — though withdrawal does not oblige the association to retrieve what it already published. Separately, association records “shall not be used for commercial purposes” (§ 38-33.3-317(7)).

2. The membership list has its own rule. Under the nonprofit code, without the board’s consent, it may not be obtained or used for any purpose unrelated to a member’s interest as a member, and specifically may not be used to solicit money or property (unless the money or property will be used solely to solicit member votes in an association election), used for any commercial purpose, or sold to or purchased by anyone (§ 7-136-105). CCIOA carries a parallel bar at § 38-33.3-317(2)(b).

3. A government agency generally cannot make the association hand it over. Section 7-90-107 bars a public agency — any state or local governmental unit — from compelling a nonprofit entity to produce, or from itself disclosing, “member-specific data”. The exceptions are long, and include subpoenas, discovery under a protective order, and regulatory filings. The remedy is not soft: notwithstanding the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, the association or any of its members may sue for injunctive relief and damages of not less than $2,500 for a reckless violation and $7,500 for an intentional one, plus costs, attorney fees and witness fees.

4. Misuse can be a crime, and the threshold is lower than people assume. “Personal identifying information” is defined to include, among other things, a name, a date of birth, a social security number, a password, a driver’s licence or identification card number, a passport number, biometric data, or an employer or student identification number (§ 18-5-901(13)). Knowingly using another person’s personal identifying information, financial identifying information or financial device without permission, intending to obtain anything of value or make a payment, is identity theft — a class 4 felony; knowingly possessing it with intent to use it or let someone else use it is a class 2 misdemeanor, rising to a class 5 felony where three or more devices, or the information of three or more people, are involved (§ 18-5-902). Knowingly making a materially false statement to obtain, record or access someone’s identifying information is gathering identity information by deception, a class 5 felony (§ 18-5-904). Possessing another person’s actual driver’s licence, government identification card, social security card or passport without permission is its own offence (§ 18-5-903.5), as is possessing a lost or stolen financial device (§ 18-5-903) or the tools used to commit identity theft (§ 18-5-905).

These are criminal statutes enforced by prosecutors, not private remedies. They are here because the line they draw is the backstop behind the civil records rules above — not because a records dispute is ordinarily a criminal matter.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-209.5(9) points a party with an assessment, fine or fee dispute of $7,500 or less at small claims court. What it does not tell you is how much of § 13-6-403 was written specifically for communities.

Two HOA grants of jurisdiction, on top of the ordinary money limit. Small claims has concurrent jurisdiction to enforce rights and responsibilities arising under the declaration, bylaws, covenants or other governing documents of a unit owners’ association in disputes over assessments, fines or fees where the amount at issue is $7,500 or less (§ 13-6-403(1)(b)(I)); and separately to enforce a restrictive covenant on residential property where “the amount required to comply with the covenant” does not exceed $7,500 (§ 13-6-403(1)(b)(II)). Note the second measure — it is the cost of compliance, not a damages figure.

And the exception that matters most. Small claims courts have no jurisdiction over injunctive relief — except, among a short list, to enforce rights or responsibilities under an association’s governing documents, “and including actions seeking declaratory relief”, and to enforce restrictive covenants on residential property (§ 13-6-403(2)(h)(I), (II)). So in a covenant dispute this is one of the few places you can ask a court to order something done, or declare what the documents mean, without a district court filing. And it is built to be used without a lawyer. Section 13-6-407(2)(a)(I) requires an individual to represent themselves and an association to appear through an active member or a full-time employee — a nonprofit corporation through “a duly elected nonattorney officer or an employee” — and (2)(a)(II) states the intent that no attorney appear except pro se or as one of those people, “except as permitted by supreme court rule.” Two consequences worth knowing: if an attorney does properly appear, the other party may be represented by counsel too (§ 13-6-407(4)); and § 13-6-407(1) bars an assignee who is not a real party to the transaction from commencing an action at all, so a collection agency that bought the debt cannot use this court.

What it still cannot do. No defamation, no forcible entry, forcible detainer or unlawful detainer — so no evictions — no class actions, no prejudgment remedies, no traffic or criminal matters (§ 13-6-403(2)). The $7,500 ceiling is exclusive of interest and costs for the ordinary money claim and both HOA grants (§ 13-6-403(1)(a), (1)(b)(I), (1)(b)(II)); the replevin and specific-performance grants at (1)(b)(III) and (IV) carry no such phrase.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-303.5 is only half the story. It governs what your board must do before suing a builder — the owner meeting, the ten disclosures, the 65 percent vote. The Construction Defect Action Reform Act governs what happens next, and it applies to an individual owner’s claim as much as an association’s.

The clock starts before the complaint. No later than 75 days before filing — 90 days for commercial property — a claimant must send a written notice of claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service, describing the claim in reasonable detail including the type and location of the construction alleged to be defective (§§ 13-20-803.5(1)(a), 13-20-802.5(5)).

Then the builder gets to look, and to offer. On written request the claimant must give reasonable access to inspect, and the inspection must be completed within 30 days of service of the notice (§ 13-20-803.5(2)). Within 30 days after the inspection (45 for commercial) the professional may offer to settle for a sum certain or to remedy the defect — and an offer to remedy must include the scope and findings of the inspection, a description of the work needed, and a timetable (§ 13-20-803.5(3)). An offer is deemed rejected unless accepted in writing within 15 days (§ 13-20-803.5(4)).

The disclosure duty is the part claimants underuse. By the earlier of making an offer or 60 days after actual notice of the claim, the construction professional must hand over — so far as they hold them — all plans, specifications and soil reports related to the claim, maintenance recommendations, the name, last-known address and scope of work of every professional who worked on it, all third-party inspection documents, and copies of every insurance policy related to the claim (§ 13-20-803.5(3.5)(a)). Reasonable copying costs may be charged for most of it — but not for the list of who did the work. And there is a sanction: failing to identify those professionals by the nonparty-at-fault deadline bars the builder from later blaming them as nonparties (§ 13-20-803.5(3.5)(c)). Architects and engineers have their own parallel list (§ 13-20-803.5(3.7)).

Skipping the process does not end your case — it freezes it. An action commenced without complying “shall be stayed… until the claimant has complied” (§ 13-20-803.5(9)). And the limitation clock is protected while you comply: sending the notice inside the limitation or repose period tolls it until 60 days after the notice-of-claim process completes, with mitigation tolling available on top, capped at one year (§ 13-20-805).

The definition that decides what a win is worth. A claimant “shall not recover more than actual damages” (§ 13-20-803.5(12)), and “actual damages” is defined as the fair market value without the defect, the replacement cost, or the reasonable cost to repair — whichever is less — together with relocation costs and, for residential property, other direct economic costs of loss of use, interest, and such costs and fees as a contract or law allows (§ 13-20-802.5(2)). An association budgeting a defect claim on repair cost alone may be budgeting the wrong number.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(j) stops an association prohibiting “the use of a rain barrel… to collect precipitation from a residential rooftop in accordance with section 37-96.5-103”. Those last five words are the whole limit, and they are precise.

Precipitation may be collected only if no more than two rain barrels with a combined capacity of 110 gallons or less are used; the roof is on a building used primarily as a single-family residence, or a multi-family residence with four or fewer units; the water is used for outdoor purposes including irrigating lawns and gardens; and it is used on the property where it was collected (§ 37-96.5-103(1)). It may not be used for drinking water or any indoor household purpose (§ 37-96.5-103(2)), and the state engineer may curtail use (§ 37-96.5-103(3)).

A “rain barrel” is a defined thing too — a storage container with a sealable lid, located aboveground outside a residential home, used to collect precipitation from a downspout of a rooftop (§ 37-96.5-102(1)).

So the practical line is clear. A board cannot ban your two barrels. It is not prevented from objecting to a third barrel, a 200-gallon cistern, an open-topped container, or collection at a building with more than four units — none of those is what CCIOA protects. And one much larger limit sits in CCIOA itself. Section 38-33.3-106.5(1)(j)(II) confers no right to place a rain barrel on, or connect one to, property that is leased without the lessor’s permission, a common element or limited common element, maintained by the association, or attached to another unit without those owners’ permission. In practice that removes most condominium and attached-unit situations. And remember CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(j)(III): the association may still impose reasonable aesthetic requirements on placement and external appearance.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(i.5)(II) requires an association to select at least three water-wise garden designs, preapproved for installation in front yards — though § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(i.5)(VI) limits the whole subsection to single-family detached homes, expressly not to an attached home sharing a wall and not to a condominium, and a design qualifies only if it “adhere[s] to the principles of water-wise landscaping, as defined in section 37-60-135 (2)(l)” or forms part of a local water provider’s conservation programme. Here is what that standard actually says.

Water-wise landscaping means a water- and plant-management practice that is intended to be functional and attractive and emphasises plants requiring lower supplemental water, such as native and drought-tolerant plants — and that prioritises seven key principles: planning and design for water conservation, beauty and utility; improving soil; applying efficient irrigation; limiting turf to high-traffic, essential areas; selecting low water demand plants; applying mulch; and maintaining the landscape (§ 37-60-135(2)(l)).

Two things follow. A board cannot reject one of the three designs it selected on aesthetic instinct — the statute deems those preapproved as complying with its aesthetic guidelines, and requires it to allow reasonable substitute plants where a listed plant is unavailable — and “intended to be functional and attractive” and “maintaining the landscape” are part of the standard, so an unmaintained gravel yard is not automatically compliant either.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(k) stops an association prohibiting the operation of “a family child care home… that is licensed”. Both halves are load-bearing, and the term is defined.

A family child care home is a facility for child care, operated with or without compensation or educational purposes, in a place of residence of a family or person, providing less than twenty-four-hour care for children under eighteen who are not related to the head of the home (§ 26.5-5-303(7)). It may include infant-toddler homes, large family child care homes and experienced-provider homes. A child care center is a different thing — a facility maintained for the whole or part of a day for the care of five or more children eighteen or younger who are not related to the owner, operator or manager (§ 26.5-5-303(3)) — and CCIOA’s protection does not extend to one.

What the association keeps. CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(1)(k)(II) preserves its rules on architectural control, parking, landscaping and noise, while requiring reasonable accommodation for fencing requirements applicable to licensed homes; (III) excludes communities qualifying as housing for older persons; and (IV) lets the association require liability insurance naming it as an additional insured, primary to the association’s own cover.

CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(4) voids as against public policy any declaration, bylaw or rule — adopted before or after May 13, 2024 — that restricts creating an accessory dwelling unit as an accessory use to a single-unit detached dwelling “in any way that is prohibited by section 29-35-403”, in a subject jurisdiction or an ADU supportive jurisdiction. So the association’s limits are pinned to the jurisdiction’s.

What § 29-35-403 stops the jurisdiction doing — and so, through CCIOA, stops your covenants doing. From June 30, 2025 a subject jurisdiction must allow, subject to an administrative approval process, one ADU as an accessory use to a single-unit detached dwelling anywhere it allows single-unit detached dwellings (§ 29-35-403(1)) — none of it reaching an exempt parcel (§ 29-35-403(4)): one without domestic water and sewer or with a well that cannot supply another dwelling, a historic property outside a historic district, or a parcel in a floodway or 100-year floodplain (§ 29-35-402(9)). It may not require a new off-street parking space for the construction or conversion, subject to two exceptions: it may require an existing driveway, garage or tandem space to be designated for the ADU (§ 29-35-403(3)(a)), and it may require one new space where the parcel has no existing off-street space, sits in a district that required parking for the primary dwelling as of January 1, 2024, and is on a block where on-street parking is prohibited (§ 29-35-403(3)(b)); may not apply a restrictive design or dimension standard; and — the provision most likely to collide with a set of covenants — may not require the ADU, or any other dwelling on the same lot, to be owner-occupied, save for demonstrating residence at the point of applying to build or convert, or when applying for a short-term rental permit (§ 29-35-403(2)).

Reasonable restrictions survive. CCIOA § 38-33.3-106.5(4)(c) preserves a “substantive condition or requirement that does not unreasonably increase the cost to construct, effectively prohibit the construction of, or extinguish the ability to otherwise construct” an ADU. And note the separate rule at § 38-33.3-106.5(6): for any declaration recorded, or bylaws or rules adopted or amended, on or after July 1, 2024, an association may not prohibit ADUs or middle housing where local zoning would allow them — unless the restriction was already there on May 30, 2024.

The transit and neighborhood centre rule works the same way (§ 38-33.3-106.5(5)): inside a transit center or neighborhood center, no declaration, bylaw or rule may restrict housing development more than the local law does. Each of those three terms is defined elsewhere — a neighborhood center is an area meeting statutory requirements and designated as such by a local government (§ 29-35-202(5)), while a transit center is designated by a transit-oriented community (§ 29-35-202(9)), and “local law” is any code, ordinance, policy, regulation or rule governing the development and use of land (§ 29-35-103(12)). Whether your community sits inside a designated centre is a question for the local government, not the board.

Colorado routinely writes repeal dates into regulatory statutes and then extends them. Three of them sit under the pages HOPB hosts, and each is worth checking before relying on the law years from now.

September 1, 2027 — the Civil Rights Division and Commission. Part 3 of Title 24, Article 34 “is repealed, effective September 1, 2027”, with the functions of the division and commission scheduled for review beforehand (§ 24-34-304(2)). Part 3 is the machinery a fair housing charge runs through — the charge, the investigation, the probable cause finding, the hearing. Note the exceptions at § 24-34-306(14): a Part 6 public accommodation claim, and a private housing action under § 24-34-505.6, do not have to exhaust it.

September 1, 2028 — the entire Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. “This article 16 is repealed, effective September 1, 2028”, subject to review beforehand (§ 5-16-135). That is the whole of the state debt-collection statute, licensing and all.

September 1, 2030 — the HOA Information and Resource Center. The section creating the Center and the HOA information officer “is repealed, effective September 1, 2030”, scheduled for review before then (§ 12-10-801(6)). The Center is the free resource that CCIOA’s delinquency and pre-foreclosure notices are required to point owners toward.

None of these is a prediction that the law will lapse — sunset review usually continues an agency or a statute. It is a reason to check the date rather than assume permanence.