Miscellaneous & related California laws

Any provision of a governing document, as defined in Civ. § 4150 or § 6552, that effectively prohibits or restricts the installation or use of a solar energy system is void and unenforceable (Civ. § 714(a)). Reasonable restrictions survive — but the statute does not leave “reasonable” to argument. A restriction is unreasonable if it significantly increases cost or decreases efficiency or specified performance and does not allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency and energy conservation benefits, and “significantly” is defined in dollars: for solar water and pool heating, an amount exceeding 10% of system cost but in no case more than $1,000, or an efficiency loss over 10%; for photovoltaic systems, an amount not to exceed $1,000 over the cost as originally specified, or an efficiency loss over 10% (Civ. § 714(b), (d)(1)).

The deadline most boards miss. Where approval is required, the application must be processed like any architectural application and “shall not be willfully avoided or delayed.” For an association, approval or denial shall be in writing, and if the application is not denied in writing within 45 days of receipt, it is deemed approved — unless the delay results from a reasonable request for additional information (Civ. § 714(e)).

The teeth. A willful violation makes the association liable for actual damages plus a civil penalty of up to $1,000 (Civ. § 714(f)), and in any action to enforce the section “the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees” (Civ. § 714(g)).

What an association still may do. Civ. § 714.1 preserves reasonable provisions restricting installation in common areas to systems the association approved, requiring approval before an owner installs in someone else’s separate interest, providing for maintenance, repair or replacement of roofs or other building components, and requiring installers to indemnify or reimburse the association or its members for loss or damage caused by the installation, maintenance or use of the system (Civ. § 714.1(a)).

And what it may not do — the half of the section that matters most. An association shall not establish a general policy prohibiting the installation or use of a rooftop solar energy system for household purposes on the roof of the building in which the owner resides, or on a garage or carport adjacent to that building assigned to the owner for exclusive use; and it shall not require approval by a vote of members — including a vote under Civ. § 4600 — for such an installation. Association action contravening either is “void and unenforceable” (Civ. § 714.1(b)).

A covenant, restriction or condition in a deed, contract or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale of any interest in real property that effectively prohibits or unreasonably restricts the construction or use of an accessory dwelling unit or junior accessory dwelling unit on a lot zoned for single-family residential use meeting the Government Code requirements is void and unenforceable (Civ. § 714.3(a)). As with solar, genuinely reasonable restrictions survive — those that do not unreasonably increase the cost to construct, effectively prohibit the construction of, or extinguish the ability to otherwise construct the unit. And note what cannot qualify: “reasonable restrictions” shall not include any fees or other financial requirements (Civ. § 714.3(b)).

Separately, governing documents shall not prohibit the sale, lease, rent or use of property on the basis that the structure was constructed in an offsite facility or factory and moved to the property in sections or modules — though the documents may still be applied uniformly to all structures (Civ. § 714.5). Check the date on your CC&Rs before relying on it: the section applies only to covenants, conditions and restrictions or other management documents adopted on or after its effective date, 1 January 1988, so an older recorded document is not reached by it.

The good-neighbour fence law matters in communities where lot-line fences are the owners’ responsibility rather than the association’s. Adjoining landowners share equally in the responsibility for maintaining the boundaries between them, and — unless they have agreed otherwise in a written agreement — are presumed to share an equal benefit from a dividing fence and to be equally responsible for the reasonable costs of construction, maintenance or necessary replacement (Civ. § 841(a), (b)(1)).

You cannot simply be invoiced. A landowner intending to incur those costs shall give 30 days’ prior written notice to each affected adjoining landowner, and that notice must include the presumption of equal responsibility, a description of the problem, the proposed solution, the estimated costs, the proposed cost-sharing approach and the proposed timeline (Civ. § 841(b)(2)).

The presumption can be beaten. It is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence showing equal responsibility would be unjust, and the court shall consider whether the burden is substantially disproportionate to the benefit, whether the cost exceeds the resulting increase in property value, undue financial hardship shown by reasonable proof, and whether the project’s costs are unnecessary, excessive, or the result of the other owner’s personal aesthetic preferences (Civ. § 841(b)(3)). Where the presumption is rebutted the court shall, in its discretion, order either a contribution of less than an equal share or no contribution at all — the discretion is only as between those two (Civ. § 841(b)(4)).

Parking is one of the few association powers written into a code no one thinks to open. Veh. § 22658 names associations directly: the owner or person in lawful possession of private property, “including an association of a common interest development, as defined in Sections 4080 and 4100 or Sections 6528 and 6534 of the Civil Code,” may cause a vehicle parked on the property to be removed to a storage facility meeting subdivision (n) (Veh. § 22658(a)).

Only on one of four grounds. A sign displayed in plain view at all entrances, not less than 17 inches by 22 inches, with lettering not less than one inch high, prohibiting public parking, stating that vehicles will be removed at the owner’s expense, and carrying the local traffic law enforcement telephone number and the name and telephone number of each towing company that is party to a written general towing authorisation agreement; or a notice of parking violation issued and 96 hours elapsed; or a vehicle lacking an engine, transmission, wheels, tires, doors, windshield or other major part necessary to operate safely, with local traffic law enforcement notified and 24 hours elapsed; or a lot improved with a single-family dwelling (Veh. § 22658(a)(1)–(4)).

Someone has to be there. A towing company shall not remove or commence the removal of a vehicle from private property without first obtaining written authorisation from the property owner or lessee, including an association of a common interest development, or an employee or agent of it, “who shall be present at the time of removal and verify the alleged violation” (Veh. § 22658(l)(1)(A)) — the only exception being a residential rental property of 15 or fewer units with no onsite owner, agent or employee, where the tenant has verified the violation and requested the tow from that tenant’s own assigned parking space in a signed request or email; using that exemption and then failing to comply with the subdivision is an infraction punishable by a $1,000 fine (Veh. § 22658(e)(2)). That authorisation must record the make, model, VIN and plate, the name, signature, job title, address and working telephone number of the person authorising it, the grounds for removal, when the vehicle was first observed parked, and when authorisation was given (Veh. § 22658(l)(1)(B)).

Standing authority to tow at the company’s discretion is not delegable — except for a vehicle unlawfully parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant or in a fire lane, or in a manner interfering with an entrance to or exit from the property, and then only under a written agreement and with a photograph clearly showing the violation taken before removal (Veh. § 22658(l)(1)(E), (l)(2)). The company keeps those records three years and must produce them to law enforcement, the Attorney General, a district attorney or a city attorney within 24 hours of a request without a warrant (Veh. § 22658(l)(3)).

The teeth run against the association. An owner, person in lawful possession, or an association of a common interest development that causes a removal is liable for double the storage or towing charges where it failed to comply with the sign, the 96-hour or the 24-hour ground, or failed to state the grounds for removal when the legal or registered owner asked (Veh. § 22658(e)(1)). It must also notify the local traffic law enforcement agency within one hour after authorising the tow (Veh. § 22658(f)). Violating the written-authorisation subdivision is a misdemeanor and carries civil liability to the vehicle owner of four times the towing and storage charges (Veh. § 22658(l)(4), (5)).

If you reach the truck in time. On request of the vehicle owner or their agent, the towing company or its driver “shall immediately and unconditionally release” a vehicle that is not yet removed from the property and in transit, and failing to do so is a misdemeanor (Veh. § 22658(g)(1)(B), (C)) — you then have to move the vehicle to a lawful location immediately (Veh. § 22658(g)(2)). If you return after the car is coupled to the tow truck but before it leaves the property, the charge is not more than one-half the regular towing charge; the full charge may only be imposed once the vehicle has left and is in transit (Veh. § 22658(h)).

And once it is gone. A charge is excessive if it exceeds what would have been charged on a law-enforcement tow or the operator’s CHP-approved rate, whichever is greater, and charging an excessive rate makes the person civilly liable to the vehicle owner for four times the amount charged (Veh. § 22658(i)(1), (j)(1)). Release within 24 hours of arriving is one day’s storage only (Veh. § 22658(i)(2)). The storage facility shall accept cash or a valid bank credit card and must post a notice saying so, at four times the towing and storage charges if it does not (Veh. § 22658(k)). It must sit within a 10-mile radius of where the vehicle was taken from unless the towing company holds prior general written approval from the law enforcement agency with primary jurisdiction, stay open during normal business hours — defined as Monday to Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., except state holidays — and release after hours for a gate fee capped at half the hourly tow rate (Veh. § 22658(n)). Separately, a tow company that cuts, removes, damages or leaves open a fence while removing a vehicle, without the property owner’s prior approval, must either locate and notify the owner or person in charge of the property, or leave its name and address and the vehicle’s number in a conspicuous place on the property and notify the police — the sheriff or the CHP in unincorporated territory. Failing to comply with all the requirements is an infraction (Veh. § 22658.1(a), (b)).

The public street inside the community is a different rule. Where a vehicle is parked for more than 24 hours on a portion of highway lying within the boundaries of a common interest development, and signs meeting Veh. § 22658(a)(1) have been posted saying vehicles left over 24 hours will be removed at the owner’s expense, removal is authorised pursuant to a resolution or ordinance adopted by the local authority — and the person who may remove it is a peace officer, a salaried parking-enforcement employee, or a trained volunteer of a law enforcement agency, not the association (Veh. § 22651, § 22651(q); Veh. § 22651.05(a), (a)(5)). Nothing in § 22658 limits other removal remedies, and a vehicle owner may recover for damage caused by any intentional or negligent act of the person causing or carrying out the removal (Veh. § 22658(c), (d)).

HOPB does not host the Vehicle Code in full. The article containing these sections — Division 11, Chapter 10, Article 1, Authority to Remove Vehicles [22650–22711] — was read in full before this card was written; the official text is at California Legislative Information.

Davis-Stirling repeatedly points members here — a records-inspection action may be brought in small claims court, and an association owed less than $1,800 may sue there rather than foreclose. So the limits matter.

The ceiling is not one number. General small claims jurisdiction runs to $6,250 (CCP § 116.220(a)(1)). But an action brought by a natural person may go up to $12,500 (CCP § 116.221). An incorporated association is not a natural person, so as a practical matter the homeowner has the higher ceiling.

There is a frequency cap. No person may file more than two small claims actions in which the demand exceeds $2,500 anywhere in the state in a calendar year, and any claimant demanding more than $2,500 must file a declaration under penalty of perjury confirming it (CCP § 116.231(a), (b)).

No attorneys, and no hired representative. Except in narrow situations — principally an attorney appearing for themselves — no attorney may take part in the conduct or defense of a small claims action (CCP § 116.530). An attorney may still advise you before or after, and may represent you on an appeal to the superior court or in enforcing a judgment (CCP § 116.530(c)). A corporation may generally appear only through a regular employee or a duly appointed or elected officer or director employed, appointed or elected for purposes other than solely representing the corporation in small claims court (CCP § 116.540(b)).

But associations are the express exception — do not expect to face an employee. CCP § 116.540(b) opens “Except as additionally provided in subdivision (i),” and subdivision (i) is written for communities: a party that is an association created to manage a common interest development may appear and participate “through an agent, a management company representative, or bookkeeper” (CCP § 116.540(i)). So the manager or the management company can and routinely does stand in for the association. The one check on it: the court shall require that representative to file a declaration stating their authority and its basis, and that they are not employed solely to represent the association in small claims court (CCP § 116.540(j)).

A notice of pendency of action clouds title and can stop a sale or refinance. Any party to an action who asserts a real property claim may record one in each county where the property sits (CCP § 405.20), and a “real property claim” means a cause of action that would, if meritorious, affect title to or the right to possession of specific real property, or the use of an identified easement (CCP § 405.4).

The burden on a motion to expunge sits with whoever recorded it. Any party — or any nonparty with an interest in the property, on leave to intervene — may move to expunge (CCP § 405.30). The court shall order it expunged if the pleading does not contain a real property claim (CCP § 405.31), and shall order it expunged if the claimant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, the probable validity of the real property claim (CCP § 405.32). In both cases the court shall not require the moving owner to post an undertaking.

And fees follow the motion. The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under the chapter be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing it — unless the other side acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make an award unjust (CCP § 405.38).

Alongside FEHA and Unruh sits a separate statute, and Gov. Code § 12948 makes denying a right created by Civ. §§ 54, 54.1 or 54.2 a FEHA unlawful practice in its own right. That is the bridge between the two.

Read its scope carefully before relying on it. Civ. § 54 is about the full and free use of streets, sidewalks, public buildings and other public places, and Civ. § 54.1(a) about full and equal access to common carriers, hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation and “other places to which the general public is invited.” Its housing arm, Civ. § 54.1(b)(1), reaches housing accommodations offered for rent, lease, or compensation — and the modification duty there is framed for rented premises, where the landlord may condition permission on an agreement to restore the interior (Civ. § 54.1(b)(3)(A)). For an owner-occupier in a common interest development, FEHA and Unruh remain the main route.

Service animals. Every individual with a disability has the right to be accompanied by a guide, signal or service dog in the places specified in Civ. § 54.1, without paying an extra charge or security deposit — though the individual remains liable for damage the dog does (Civ. § 54.2(a)).

The remedy. Anyone who denies or interferes with those rights is liable for actual damages and up to three times actual damages, but in no case less than $1,000, plus attorney’s fees (Civ. § 54.3(a)). Note the floor is $1,000 here against Unruh’s $4,000 under Civ. § 52(a) — and the choice is forced, not academic: no one may be held liable for damages under both Civ. § 54.3 and Civ. § 52 for the same act or failure to act (Civ. § 54.3(c)).